174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq1

661. Your 956.2 Assume Deptel 6553 received too late for use May 5 conversation with Fon Min.

Additionally, you may tell GOI (1) Iranians are and have been kept fully aware of US view that Iranian and US interests dictate making every effort improve Iran-Iraq relations and avoid disruptive steps. However, as we have often said to Iraqis, we do not control Iranian foreign policy, just as we do not control foreign policies Turkey, Pakistan, [Page 351] Greece, India, others. We cannot recall any instance where country in free world agreed relinquish control over any element its national policy as result its relations with another nation.

(2) Department recommends Embassy go ahead with procedure suggested reftel concerning recall Vanli from US by Kurds in Iraq. FYI: Meanwhile we checking regulations and implications involved possible deportation including possible bearing registration as foreign agent on deportation proceedings. End FYI.

Jernegan in meeting with Ambassador Al-Hani on other matter (reported separately) May 5 conveyed points in 1 and 2 above except for first sentence under 1. He reiterated that our reply to Kurdish petitions is always the same, we regard their problem an internal affair of Iraq. Jernegan said he thought Fon Min over-concerned about Vanli who has been singularly unsuccessful in US. (Ambassador Al-Hani volunteered he had reported in same vein to Foreign Office.)

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore and Howison on May 5, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Ankara, London, Tehran, and Tel Aviv.
  2. In telegram 956, May 5, Strong reported another meeting with Talib during which the Foreign Minister again raised the question of U.S. policy on the Kurds. Talib also expressed doubt that Kurdish representative Vanli, who was attempting to establish a permanent headquarters in the United States for Kurdish rebels, could be operating there against the will of the U.S. Government. He requested that the United States preclude Vanli from engaging in political activity and expel him from the United States, and persuade Iran to cease encouraging and aiding Iraqi Kurds. Strong commented that it appeared that the Iraqi Government was reaching the point of desperation. He suggested that Vanli’s visa be canceled and deportation proceedings started and that he be authorized to pass to Mulla Mustafa Barzani a U.S request that Vanli be instructed to leave the United States. (Ibid.)