Office of the Historian

161. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, December 12, 1968, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Bahrain Problem

PARTICIPANTS

  • His Highness Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait
  • His Excellency Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • His Excellency Abdul Rahman Ateeqi, Minister of Finance and Oil
  • His Excellency Talat al-Ghoussein, Kuwait Ambassador to the US
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Howard R. Cottam, US Ambassador to Kuwait
  • Mr. Parker T. Hart, Assistant Secretary for NEA
  • Mr. William D. Brewer, Country Director, NEA/ARP
  • Mr. Camille Nowfel, Interpreter

The Amir asked the Secretary’s view regarding the Iranian claim to Bahrain. The Secretary said he did not wish to get into the technical aspects but there was one basic idea which helped predict the attitude of the American people on such disputes, i.e., what did the people concerned (in this case Bahrain) think about it. We did not seek to judge the 30-40 territorial disputes around the world. We did believe [Page 332] these issues should be solved peacefully and in accordance with the interests and wishes of the people concerned. The Secretary said it was not his impression that Iran sought a solution by force.

Iran had taken a responsible attitude but there was an historical claim and some way should be found to work out a solution in accordance with views of the people concerned. These ancient lands, which had exchanged Ambassadors long before the US existed, should be able to find a way to settle this problem.

The Amir said that the Shah had made clear when in Kuwait in mid-November that Iran had no intention to resort to force on this problem. The Shah was seeking a way out with dignity. The question was what way. The Amir felt USG help was needed, noting that Kuwait was doing its part. Two months ago Kuwait had been instrumental in arranging an Iran/Bahrain meeting at Geneva and the two sides would meet again.

The Secretary said he would consult his colleagues as to whether we might have any ideas to help produce a settlement. The Amir said he would appreciate it if the USG could keep in touch with the GOK on this matter. The Secretary congratulated the Amir for arranging the first Geneva meeting and said he hoped good would come out of this process.

Assistant Secretary Hart asked whether the Amir had close personal contact with the Ruler of Bahrain and requested the Amir’s estimate as to the loyalty of Bahrainis to their Ruler. The Amir replied that his information was that the people fully support the Ruler. Mr. Hart asked whether, should a mechanism be found to manifest Bahraini public opinion on this issue, would there be any side effects likely to undermine the island’s security. The Amir felt anything like a plebiscite unacceptable. Perhaps some effort to gather the facts regarding the wishes of the people, perhaps through the UN, might be acceptable. Ambassador Ghoussein noted that the Bahrain position did not reflect fear of the outcome but rather concern at the establishment of a principle. Minister Ateeqi said a plebiscite would represent a “shaking of confidence and a submission to a claim”.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Visit of Amir of Kuwait, Dec. 11-12, 1968. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted by Brewer on December 13 and approved in the office of the Secretary of State on December 30. The memorandum is Part II of III. The meeting was held at Blair House. The time and place of the meeting are from Rusk’s Diary. (Ibid.)↩