135. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

SUBJECT

  • Shah’s Reply on the Persian Gulf—and Your Talk with Wilson

The Shah replied immediately to your message on the Persian Gulf (attached).2 He had already made his final decision to postpone his visit to Saudi Arabia, but your letter let him know you expect him to act the statesman in developing local cooperation in the Gulf.

The Shah says he agrees with your view of the Gulf, and, although he tries to throw the blame for recent disagreements with Faisal on the Saudis, Armin Meyer thinks the Iranians are feeling guilty and will be especially good for a while. The quickness of the Shah’s reply is one indication of how he takes your views.

This doesn’t mean clear sailing ahead in the Gulf. The Shah may be feeling a bit overconfident, and his muscle-flexing may be part of the Gulf scene for some time. Also, local feuds and suspicions have long histories. But we have injected a sobering perspective at a heated moment. Fortunately, King Faisal—although deeply hurt by the Shah’s actions and more distrustful than ever—is being much more patient than anyone expected.

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The next step we will propose in your efforts to foster an orderly evolution in the Gulf is a word to Prime Minister Wilson.3 The main point is: Don’t rock the boat any more than you already have; help us buy time for the locals to work out their own arrangements for the future.

First, we want the British to leave their treaties and political relationships intact to help calm local rulers’ feelings of being deserted. Second, we want to keep the British from rushing around trying to arrange security pacts and other deals that won’t work because they’ll have an obvious “made in the UK” label. We think the best tack is for them to sit tight with their present relationships and let the locals come up with their own scheme for the future.

Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran, 1/1/68-6/30/68. Secret.
  2. Document 130.
  3. For a record of the President’s meeting with Wilson February 8-9, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XII, Document 69.