Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

127. Telegram From the Consulate General in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Dhahran, January 28, 1968, 1450Z.

505. Subj: Persian Gulf. Following is from Ambassador in Riyadh:

1. When meeting with Rashad Pharaon last night, he spoke of Saudi concern re future of Gulf in view Brit withdrawal, growing Soviet activity in ME area and generally unsatisfactory Yemeni and South Arabian situations (septels—Notal).² He wanted to know if HMG had talked to USG before taking withdrawal decision? I told him that to best my knowledge, Brits had done so at about same time Roberts Mission sent to brief King Faisal and other interested states, but not before. As I had told King, USG not happy about Brit decision and has urged HMG take no irrevocable steps. USG has also pointed out to Brits that, apart from military position, elements exist in Brit presence which littoral states may feel can continue to be of benefit and which we hope Brits will be willing discuss with littoral states. I suggested that Saudis should consider this same matter and talk to Brits about it (SecState’s 103449).³ Idea seemed new one to Rashad, but he undertook give it some study. He also wondered why HMG had not accepted offer of various Trucial States to finance continuation Brit troop commitment.

2. In answer my question if King had raised confederation idea with Ruler of Bahrain, Rashad said Ruler deeply disturbed by continuing Iranian claim and had asked Faisal for Saudi security guarantee. According Rashad, Faisal agreed give such security assurance if Ruler of Bahrain able get together with other Trucial rulers in some form of confederation. (Note: If Rashad’s version correct, Saudi security assurance to Bahrain not as categoric as some other sources have suggested.)

3. Rashad continued that status of Bahrain is major obstacle to cooperation among principal Gulf riparian states, especially with Iran. While SAG wants to cooperate with Iran, it can do so only if Shah will publicly renounce claim to Bahrain and Iranian Majlis approves such declaration. Unless this takes place any effort on part of SAG to cooperate with Iran will incur ire of other Arabs. In past few days UAR public media have already begun to attack Iranian role in Gulf. SAG has asked its Ambassador in Tehran to sound out Iranians on possibility such public declaration. Rashad asked for my thoughts on this.

4. I said would want to query Ambassador Meyer re his views, but meanwhile wished make few personal observations. It my understanding, and King Faisal had confirmed it also his, that Shah of Iran is not actively seeking to incorporate Bahrain, but that for domestic reasons he cannot publicly say so. If this true, idea of making public renunciation approved by Majlis a condition for any Saudi-Iranian cooperation in Gulf struck me as asking too much. It would not surprise me if Iranians rejected any such suggestion and if it leaves sour taste.

5. I suggested that in exploring among themselves future of Gulf, littoral states ought to get away from such terms as “ambitions” and “designs” which connote nasty, selfish competition. Instead, littoral states should begin think in terms of legitimate “interests” in Gulf on latter there understandably considerable overlap and mutuality which should constitute basis for needed cooperation in various spheres. Instead of demanding public self-denying declaration, why not work with Iran and Kuwait in developing multilateral regional institutions in fields of economic, security, etc? Such institutions would demonstrate by practical means that each littoral state is renouncing any individual ambitions in terms of the common interest. Rashad insisted such cooperation feasible only if there is self-denying declaration by Iran since otherwise Shah’s successor might jettision any arrangements now made and reassert claim to Bahrain.

6. I emphasized all littoral states are going to have to take a few “risks” in attempting develop climate of confidence which meaningful cooperation requires. Shah still young and vigorous and it seemed to me practical cooperative arrangements worked out with him now offer reasonable promise being able continue for considerable period of time. After all Shah could raise same question re King Faisal’s eventual successor. A bit of good faith is essential if anything is to be worked out.

7. Although Rashad accepted point, he remained worried that in absence some public Iranian renunciation of Bahrain, broader Arab pressures would preclude SAG from cooperating with Iran. He again alluded to UAR public media attacks. I reminded him that King has succeeded in handling Nasser during five years of intensive UAR vilification for doing what Faisal considered right in Yemen. Even now UAR heavily dependent on Saudi subsidy. Seemed to me that if King persuaded cooperation with Iran and other Gulf states is right way to proceed, he able do so with minimal regard for UAR or other radical Arab states’ views and indeed has few screws of his own that he can use if necessary. King has private assurances from Shah that he not seeking incorporate Bahrain. Cooperation among Gulf riparians should be possible in knowledge of this fact. Surely need for public declaration simply to satisfy radical Arab peripheral states hardly necessary. Those Arab states that want to attack Faisal will do so anyway irrespective whether Iranian public renunciation of Bahrain exists or not. While Rashad agreed in principle, he remained worried that so long as Iran maintains constitutional claim to Bahrain as one of its provinces, Saudis and other Arabs will find it difficult cooperate.

8. When asked what is alternative to cooperation, Rashad argued SAG can deal with each of Trucial States separately. All but Abu Dhabi now look to SAG and SAG in position “surround” Abu Dhabi. I suggested this scarcely statemanslike approach. If Saudis go it alone, so will everyone else. Each of lower Gulf rulers will play off one principal riparian against others for own advantage. Gulf will become cockpit of heightened differences of kind of which Commies and other subversives thrive. I urged SAG not attempt make price of cooperation with Iran for Gulf cooperation so high that Iranians cannot reasonably pay. I reminded him SAG always sensitive any suggestion of “conditions” and others might be expected be equally so. Shah’s forthcoming visit offers timely opportunity explore fully and frankly all ideas re future of Gulf and I hoped that on its part SAG will take advantage of visit for constructive talks.

9. For Tehran: Would appreciate your views re likelihood Iranians agreeing such Majlis approved self-denying declaration re Bahrain. Will be in Riyadh next week or so and any message best to me via Dhahran, rptd info Jidda.⁴

Allen

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Secret. Repeated to Jidda, Tehran, Kuwait, and London.
2. Reference is to telegrams 503 and 504 from Dhahran, January 28. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)
3. Document 124.
4. Telegram 10787 to Dhahran, January 30, “heartily” endorsed Allen’s comments to Rashad Pharaon (senior adviser to King Faisal) as reported in telegram 505 and noted that, at the Ambassador’s discretion, the same points might usefully be made directly to the King prior to the Shah’s arrival. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK)