125. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman Enters the Twentieth Century
A newcomer among the petroleum-exporting nations, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman may become a problem area if its anachronistic ruler fails to meet the challenges of his political rivals. With important economic interests in neighboring Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, [Page 262] the US thus could become increasingly involved in the affairs of this obscure country. We examine here the Sultanate’s potential problems and future role in Arabian Peninsula developments.
Abstract
The remote Sultanate of Muscat and Oman is about to move from obscurity into the modern world as the result of its new-found petroleum wealth. Oil income is expected to reach about $30 million per year within the near future and will alter significantly the economic circumstances of the country’s 600,000-800,000 inhabitants. The ruling Sultan, Sa’id bin Taymur al Bu Sa’id, who is preoccupied with protecting his regime against his rivals, including the Imam of Oman and several members of his own family, heretofore has actively resisted modernization and reform. Armed dissidence has occurred sporadically since 1955, supported mainly by outside Arab states such as the UAR, Syria, and Iraq. The Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF), whose officer corps of 100 includes 30 seconded and 40 contract British officers, thus far has been able to contain this dissidence, both in the Dhofar and Oman regions.
A recent intelligence report indicates that the Sultan’s son Qabus and his half-brother Tariq may be plotting his overthrow. At a meeting in September 1967, Tariq and Qabus agreed to join forces in such an attempt; the plot’s timing and bona fides are unknown, but the report alleges that Qabus intends to become Sultan and Tariq the prime minister and regent for a period of five years. Other plots involving the Imam may be in the blueprint stage, but disorganization within the Imam’s camp and the temporary preoccupation of potential backers such as the UAR, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia with the Arab-Israel issue make it unlikely that serious coup attempts will be made from this quarter within the near future.
Although it has at present minimal political importance, the Sultanate may play a growing role in future Persian Gulf developments. The Sultanate already has certain strategic importance by virtue of its location adjacent to the Straits of Hormuz at the entrance to the Gulf. With the takeover of South Arabia (the People’s Republic of South Yemen) by the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the increasing Soviet involvement in Yemen, the Saudis, Iranians, and the lesser rulers of the Persian Gulf are worried that an NLF-style revolution will spread from southern Arabia to the Gulf. Having acquired a petroleum industry and the accompanying influx of foreign workers, Muscat and Oman is now a more inviting target for such Gulf-directed activities. Anti-Sultan and anti-British propaganda attacks have long been pursued by communications media in the Arab nationalist states; recently, the USSR has turned its propaganda in this direction. The political fortunes of the Sultanate will directly influence the future of the Trucial States, [Page 263] Qatar, and Bahrain, as well as the policies of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. If a moderately progressive regime were to emerge, whether under the Sultan, Qabus, or some as yet unknown successor, Muscat and Oman could contribute to political stability in the Gulf; conversely, a radical Arab nationalist takeover would lead to increased agitation and instability in the states to the north.
Having no diplomatic representation and virtually no political or economic influence, the US can do little to affect the course of events in Muscat and Oman. However, a treaty between the US and the Sultanate2 provides a basis for establishment of a diplomatic mission and possibly a small aid or Peace Corps program. The US already has expressed its willingness to provide a Peace Corps program, and is awaiting the Sultan’s decision.
Whether dissidence in Muscat and Oman will remain at the present controllable level or increase with growing public awareness is open to speculation. We expect, however, that the Arab revolutionary countries may increase their subversive efforts in this area, particularly if there is renewed infighting between the moderate and radical camps. While it is possible that the Sultan could remain in power without adapting to his new economic conditions, or that he or a successor might institute reforms sufficient to contain popular disaffection, it is more likely that outside Arab interference and the influx of foreign elements into the Oman oilfields will lay the groundwork for increased dissidence and perhaps eventually the Sultan’s overthrow.
[Here follows the body of the memorandum.]
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 19 MUSCAT & OMAN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A note on the memorandum reads: “This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.”↩
- The United States and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman signed a Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights at Salalah on December 20, 1958. The Treaty entered into force June 11, 1960. (11 UST 1835; TIAS 4530; 380 UNTS 181)↩