Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

122. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, January 9, 1968.

SUBJECT

• British Plans to Accelerate Withdrawal of Military Presence from Persian Gulf: Your Meeting with Foreign Secretary Brown, January 11

Background

Present intense pressures on HMG to reduce government expenditures are leading the British to an imminent decision to accelerate removal of their military presence from the Persian Gulf, perhaps by 1970 if not sooner. In an effort to head off a precipitate decision of this nature, you sent last week a personal message to Foreign Secretary Brown (attached)² expressing our concern and asking that a final decision be deferred until you see him this week. His reply,³ relayed by Sir Patrick Dean, makes no commitments. In transmitting it, however, Sir Patrick made clear the Foreign Secretary wished you to know that our views, as expressed in your coming meeting with Brown, would be taken into careful consideration.

While I appreciate that you will be discussing the effect of the British cuts in terms of its global implications, I believe we are justified in making a particularly strong point of our concern for British actions in the Persian Gulf. In our judgment, a total withdrawal of British military forces in the next few years would seriously undermine the Western position in the Gulf. It will take another five years at least before the economic and political development of the Gulf states has progressed sufficiently to create an indigenous base for political stability. In the interim, at least a small British military presence will be an essential stabilizing force. While a British military withdrawal from the Gulf would not necessarily mean the end of British influence, their political presence would be far less effective if it did not have behind it the implied commitment and visible capability for military intervention. Except for Kuwait, the regimes of the Gulf states rest on shaky political foundations. It would not take much to undermine their confidence to resist the encroachment of Arab radicalism.

Moreover, the Western position in the Persian Gulf is almost entirely dependent on the British presence. There is no politically feasible way for the US or other Western power to step in with an equally effective presence once the British are gone.

Talking Points

We recommend that you make the following points to Foreign Secretary Brown when you see him later this week.

• —British influence in the Persian Gulf has been the principal stabilizing force securing Western interests in that area. The US has always attached a very high importance to the maintenance of that influence. In our judgment, any sudden or drastic weakening of the British position will seriously undermine the existing regimes and render the entire area far more vulnerable to pressures from the radical Arabs.
• —A key element of the British position is a military presence which can be deployed rapidly to support British political commitments. In our view it does not have to be large, but it would be dangerous to try to dispense with it entirely. Western “support” of a more general nature is not likely to be effective unless the Rulers have the confidence, and their radical Arab opponents the fear, that an effective military force can and will be employed.
• —Early British announcement of a specific date for leaving the Gulf could have particularly unsettling effects at the present time. We are witnessing a concerted Soviet attempt to make further inroads in the area. Their recent heightened support for the Yemeni republican government, the prospect that they may achieve a position in Southern Yemen (Aden), and the inviting target presented by the weak but oil-rich Gulf shaikhdoms, all combine to give us a good deal of concern. There is not quite a “momentum” behind these developments yet, but public knowledge of an early British move out of the Gulf could well create one.
• —We are fully sympathetic with the pressing needs of HMG to reduce government expenditures. But we wonder if, short of total withdrawal, quite substantial savings could not be effected through a reduction in the strength of the British force. In our view, maintenance of a continuing military presence will be far more important than its actual size.
• —We all hope the present period of international financial difficulties will be temporary. While some programs can be cut back now and started up again later without serious problems, the elimination of the UK military position in the Gulf would be an irreversible decision. The USG feels strongly that such an irrevocable act is warranted neither by present circumstances nor future prospects. Moreover, economies effected now could be penny-wise, pound-foolish if political changes in the Gulf were to bring about revisions in the terms by which the UK gets its oil.
• —Our own resources have been sharply curtailed by Congress. Nevertheless, we would wish to examine carefully any proposals for creating greater indigenous cohesion in the Gulf, including regional self-help measures, as a means of fostering the orderly economic and political development of the area.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 523, Persian Gulf, POL—General, January 1968. Secret. Drafted by Sterner; and cleared by Brewer and Davies, and in draft by Cheslaw and Eliot. A copy was sent to G/PM Director of Operations for Politico-Military Affairs Joseph J. Wolf.
2. Not attached; for text of Rusk’s message to Brown, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XII, Document 61.
3. Not found.
4. When the Secretary discussed British budget and defense cuts with the Foreign Secretary on January 11, Brown said that the post-devaluation financial crisis had forced the U.K. Government to look at cutting defense expenditures overseas. The decision to leave the Persian Gulf was dictated primarily by the fact that there would be no carriers or bases available to support or relieve the Persian Gulf after March 1971 when British forces would have been withdrawn from the Far East. Rusk responded that he was profoundly distressed by the proposed withdrawals from Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, particularly by the intention to announce these decisions. (Memorandum of conversation, January 11; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Memos, Vol. XIII, 1/68-7/68) The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XII, Document 64.