116. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

SUBJECT

  • South Arabia Independent Today

Just a word on what we’re doing about the independence of South Arabia—the new People’s Republic of South Yemen. British negotiations with the National Liberation Front concluded in Geneva yesterday, and for the first time we have a fairly clear picture of the post-independence government.

We are not recognizing immediately. Today and tomorrow we’ll respond to press queries by welcoming South Yemen to the family of nations. Then if the NLF continues in firm control for a week or two and acknowledges its international obligations, Secretary Rusk will recommend to you that we recognize. We want to be more sure first of Saudi views and of the ability of the NLF to act like a government.

The new government will take the usual anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, suspicious-of-the-West line. We expect it will proclaim a Nasser-style or Algerian-style “socialism,” but so far don’t have any evidence of extensive Communist ties. The NLF itself probably doesn’t know yet what its policies will be. Its only policy so far has been to get the British out and win power.

The government will face two main problems—staying in power and keeping afloat economically. South Arabia is still a collection of tribes—not a nation—and is vulnerable to a number of disruptive influences. The Saudis may exploit tribal opposition. The pro-Egyptian nationalists, who lost to the NLF in the final drive to power, may fight on. The South Arabian Army has backed the NLF so far, but it could turn to opposition. We still don’t know what kind of continuing aid the British have agreed to, but that will be crucial in determining whether the new government has to look to Cairo or Moscow.

The situation is still uncertain—and a good target for Moscow—but Nasser’s pullout in Yemen has made the transition to independence easier than we thought it could be earlier this year. We don’t look to the new government for much, but this is probably as good an outcome as we could have hoped for.

Walt
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, South Arabia, Vol. I, 7/67-11/67. Secret.