Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

113. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, November 20, 1967.

SUBJECT

• British Presence in Persian Gulf

You will recall that Sir Patrick Dean, in his meeting with you on November 1, made it clear that British withdrawal from South Arabia would not affect HMG’s determination to remain in the Persian Gulf. This is further encouraging evidence that this remains the British view, in fact stemming from the trip to the Gulf this month of the new UK Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Goronwy Roberts (vice George Thompson).

Roberts’ trip was primarily for purposes of area familiarization but HMG is using the occasion to seek to counter speculation on the part of Gulf states that the ouster of the Sultans in South Arabia is a harbinger of things to come in the Gulf. These local leaders have felt that the British were willing passively to allow this to happen, and that they were in fact prepared to abandon traditional friends in order to make a deal with the activist insurgents. The Saudis have been particularly bitter in their criticism of what they regard as British policy, i.e. that the UK is turning its back on conservative, traditional elements in the peninsula.

In response to our London Embassy’s queries on the subject, Foreign Office representatives have also recently confirmed that the UK intends to maintain a military presence in the Gulf at least until the mid-1970’s. One qualified spokesman assured us that HMG intends to remain in the Gulf as long as needed, i.e., until adequate local security arrangements are devised.

Roberts has been renewing expressions of British support in order to preserve the Gulf States relations with, and dependence upon, Britain in the years immediately ahead. In the British view (with which we concur), should the Gulf States lose the incentive to cooperate with the UK (for fear of losing control), the Rulers would take whatever courses seemed most likely to preserve their position. Their moves might well obstruct modernization and initiate restrictive practices which would stimulate growth of the very opposition they fear.

Meanwhile, the Saudis, who want the British to remain engaged for sometime longer, view themselves as their logical successors in the role of the major stabilizing factor in the area. However, the Saudis do not want to deal with the multitude of petty shaikhdoms which now exist. They are already thinking in terms of one or more federations of peninsula states with which they could more easily deal. SAG is talking with the British about a possible 100 million program to build up the Saudi navy, primarily in the Gulf. Such action is presumably directed to improving the Saudi bargaining position vis-a-vis Iran.

The evident British intention to soldier on in the Gulf is reassuring. We believe every opportunity should be taken to encourage them in this direction, since no power on the horizon is likely to replace the security and stability the British now provide. We should also take advantage of opportunities as they arise quietly to encourage: (a) greater Saudi/Iranian understanding on Gulf problems, and (b) more cooperation among Gulf mini-states to improve changes for regional stability after the British go.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer on November 17 and cleared by Davies and Cheslaw.