109. Memorandum From John W. Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- South Arabia Moves Toward Independence
The British Cabinet decided last week that, come what may, British forces will pull out of South Arabia sometime November 22-30. No one—least of all the Brits—pretends to know what will follow. But this will at least describe the main elements in the situation.
The intelligence community’s guess today is that the National Liberation Front (NLF) has the best chance of taking over. This is the most home-grown of the nationalist groups, having opposed both the UAR-backed FLOSY and the Saudi-backed South Arabian League. The NLF has already taken over fairly easily in most of South Arabia, and in the past week’s fighting continues to appear stronger than FLOSY in Aden. Nasser’s pullout in Yemen apparently weakened FLOSY’s base.
This would mean a short-term victory for one nationalist group rather than establishment of the broader coalition which Nasser and Faisal envisioned at Khartoum. South Arabian nationalist leaders have been in Cairo trying to negotiate the composition of a post-independence government. But the NLF in Aden seems to have pre-empted. Renewed fighting between the NLF and FLOSY and the army’s announcement yesterday that it will back the NLF in forming a government probably make any Cairo agreement meaningless.
The army remains the big question mark. Until now it has played a mediating role, trying to enforce a cease-fire on all contending groups. As long as it kept on that tack, its leaders were able to keep its own contending factions together. The next couple of days will tell whether the army is mainly pro-NLF or whether it will split into substantial factions that will end up on opposite sides in a civil war. If the army stands firm, then we may have seen the worst of the bloodshed. If it splits, the fighting in Aden could be severe, and even the up-country sultans might be tempted to reclaim the domains which the NLF has recently taken over from them.
No one—including the British—is sure that the NLF can form a viable government, or how such a government will act. Having fought rather than [Page 236] negotiated its way to near-power, it will be vulnerable to continued opposition. The survival of any government will depend for a time on outside aid, and the British have suspended any decision on continuing aid until after they see what government they’re dealing with.
Others appear to be waiting too. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran and probably the USSR all appear to be waiting for the dust to settle before doing anything. Faisal, despite his feeling that the British have dumped his up-country conservative friends, will probably stand aside for fear of creating any excuse for Nasser to delay his withdrawal from Yemen. Faisal’s final position will depend on which faction of the NLF appears to have come out on top—the radicals or a relatively moderate group.
We and the British had hoped to line up an impressive string of early friendly recognitions for the new state, but we’re temporarily stymied by the absence of any government to recognize. State has contingency plans for recognizing and getting an ambassador out, but they’re holding back too. They may have to evacuate our people instead.
Despite the potential disruption and danger to our people, we shouldn’t ignore the positive elements in this situation. Much as we may hate to admit it, the June war has probably made the South Arabian transition easier for us and our friends. Nasser’s role there is diminished, and we long ago decided—as we thought Faisal would, too—that we could live with any regime that did not have his hand in it. The new government may well be hostile to us, but unless there is an unexpected amount of Communist activity we can probably ride it out.
John
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, South Arabia, Vol. I, 7/67-11/67. Secret.↩