56. Memorandum for the Record1
- Conversation with ARAMCO Representative
ARAMCO’s Washington representative, John Pendleton, called me this afternoon to read a telegram which he had received from ARAMCO’s Vice President Brougham, who is currently visiting Beirut.
Brougham reports a conversation with Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister Yamani at Beirut airport on 23 May. Yamani is convinced there will be war between the Arabs and Israel. Syria is pushing Nasser toward war, and Russia must not resist the Syrians too sharply because Moscow fears Syria is leaning toward Peiping.
Yamani recommends that the US keep hands off this crisis, work through the UN and not try to be a policeman. He disagrees flatly with our position on the Gulf of Aqaba2 and says that if the US directly supports Israel, ARAMCO can anticipate being nationalized “if not today, then tomorrow.” If the US does not stay out of this conflict, the US is finished in the Middle East.[Page 94]
When Brougham asked Yamani why Saudi Arabia would object to our standing up to Nasser, Yamani replied, “We are all Arabs. Your government would be foolish if it does not keep out.”3
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I. Secret. An attached note indicates a copy was sent to Read.↩
- Telegram 4848 from Jidda, May 24, reported that when Ambassador Herman Eilts gave Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Sayyid Omar Saqqaf a copy of the note verbale contained in Document 35, Saqqaf stated that the Saudi Government did not agree that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway; in the Saudi view, it represented Arab waters, and the Arabs had the right to close it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ARAB–ISR)↩
- Telegram 206646 to Jidda, June 1, states that on May 25 Eugene Rostow sent an informal message via Aramco to Yamani assuring him that the U.S. Government was doing all possible to restrain the Israelis, reiterating U.S. dedication to the principle of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, and expressing the hope that the Saudi Government would realize that it too had a stake in this principle. Yamani later told Aramco he had conveyed this message to the King. Yamani commented that in his opinion, the UAR and Syria could handle Israel and therefore efforts at restraint were not important, and that even if Saudi Arabia had an interest in keeping the Gulf of Aqaba open, it could not say so. (Ibid.)↩