533. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Embassy in Argentina 1

2402. You will be getting immediately report of meeting held with Caradon (UK) and two LA’s Sun AM.2 In addition to drawing upon it, you should make following points to FonMin. UK also will be weighing in along similar lines.

We have firm evidence that while both sides still may try to get changes they will acquiesce in UK text unchanged and cooperate with UN rep. In this connection, as part of supporting evidence, please point out that UAR has had four full days to convey to UK its unwillingness to cooperate with UN rep on basis of its text, and it has not done so. Moreover, based on all info we have both sides will go along with UK res and receive UN rep based on this text.
There is no doubt that 9 necessary votes will be available in support of UK text if Argentina and Brazil go along. In fact, there is good chance of unanimous support for UK text. UK, which has been doing the lobbying in capitals for its text, can convey such voting info.
Brazilian del here has told us it is recommending to its govt that LA text not be put in, and that Brazil supports UK text even without changes discussed this morning in four power meeting reported septel.3
You should point out that UAR has announced today resumption of diplomatic relations with UK and it is inconceivable to us that 24 hours later it would announce its non-cooperation with UN rep on basis UK text.
Very confidentially you should tell FonMin that Nasser has asked us in last 24 hours whether we are willing to commit our political and diplomatic support to implementation of UK text in same way in which we had made similar commitment to him on US text. We have sent Nasser categoric “yes” answer. LA reps were so told this morning.
Also very confidentially, tell FonMin that we have been in further direct communication with King Hussein and he has told us categorically he approves UK text in present form and wants it adopted immediately.4
You should also know that contrary to indication Quijano gave Amb that Ruda instructed to consult with US, he categorically denies he has any such instructions or indeed any instructions since Fri. Indeed he has taken great umbrage to fact we referred to your telegram indicating he is supposed to be in touch with us and that Argentina would accept UK withdrawal language. Emb should be aware that Ruda’s personal involvement is increasingly interfering with discharge of what we understand to be Argentine policy and that he is sending home biased reports colored by his own personal views.
In summary, in concert with UK we continue urge (a) LA’s vote for UK text without changes as best and safest course of action, and (b) vote UK text with changes discussed this morning if needed for LA’s.5
Rio should also draw upon pertinent elements above and weigh in immediately with FonMin.6
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia and repeated Flash to the Department of State. Received at 1908Z.
  2. Telegram 2407 from USUN, November 19, reported the meeting that morning among Goldberg, Caradon, and Brazilian and Argentine representatives. Caradon urged Brazilian and Argentine support for the U.K. draft resolution but suggested as an alternative Brazilian and Argentine co-sponsorship of a revised resolution containing a few non-substantive changes from the U.K. draft. (Ibid.) Telegram 2403 from USUN, November 19, conveyed the text of the proposed alternative draft. (Ibid.)
  3. See footnote 2 above.
  4. Telegram 3994 from London, November 19, reported the delivery to the King of the message transmitted in Document 532 and his reaction. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN)
  5. Telegram 1317 from Buenos Aires, November 20, reported that the Foreign Minister had confirmed that Argentina would vote for the British draft resolution. (Ibid.)
  6. Telegram 3398 from Rio de Janeiro, November 20, reported that a Foreign Ministry official had informed the Ambassador that the Foreign Minister would recommend approval of the British draft resolution when he saw the President in the morning. (Ibid.)