Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

529. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State ¹

New York, November 18, 1967, 0414Z.

2376. Subj: ME: Caradon-Goldberg Meeting.

1. Following adjournment of SC mtg PM Nov. 17 (until PM Nov. 20), Caradon and Goldberg met to review current tactical situation and prospects for UK res.

2. Caradon said SC Pres had told him he prepared go through night with mtg Nov. 20 if necessary. Caradon said he wanted to make every effort to assure that SC would in fact conclude with vote on UK res Nov. 20. To this end he seeing LAs AM Nov. 18. He said LAs were talking of “marrying texts”, but that this clearly impossible for UK and he had given no indication to LAs that such marriage could be performed. He said he surprised LAs had instructions not vote today for UK text.

3. General discussion then developed on reasons contributing to current LA posture and extent to which LAs might or might not be satisfied with cosmetic changes in UK text. Sisco said Bernardes (Brazil) had said LAs committed publicly at home to LA text and that repeated requests for delays in its submission had irritated both govts. Sisco said Bernardes feels cosmetic changes would be sufficient and with them Brazil might be able co-sponsor UK text. If cosmetic changes possible, Bernardes said he prepared tell his govt result represents merger of LA and UK texts which will keep balance and get acquiescence both sides. If necessary, Brazil might then dissassociate itself from Argentina. Hope (UK) said Pinto, who played role in drafting LA text, partly responsible for firm Argentine line. He added that Gobbi, though not Ruda, had suggested cosmetic changes would be sufficient. Goldberg said problem with LAs was in NY, rather than in capitals, and Ruda (Argentina) primarily responsible for unyielding LA position.

4. To Caradon query on what to do to stop LAs, Goldberg replied this very tough problem since LA pride involved. He suggested UK be responsive if LAs really have only cosmetic changes in mind. Caradon said he did not himself think UK could change text to satisfy LAs. Once some changes made other attempts at changes would follow. If UK went back to SC Nov. 20 with new text there would be further delay. Caradon expressed hope he might convince LAs give UK text “clear run” first. Goldberg pointed out this would not be enough since UK must have LA votes. Caradon asked if LAs would not vote for UK text; Goldberg replied negatively and that this precisely the problem and reason that LAs must be nailed down. At same time, Goldberg suggested UK make strenuous efforts also with Japan and Ethiopia. Goldberg said he had requested of Tsuruoka that Japan support UK text, but that Tsuruoka had only replied he would meditate on question and decide. (Sisco said we would try to have Dept phone FonMin Miki who currently en route with Sato in US.) On Ethiopia, Pedersen said we had report from UK Amb Addis that Ethiopia instructed vote yes on India, abstain on US, and vote yes on UK text if Indian text fails. Goldberg urged Caradon make special effort with Makonnen since latter tends to waver and USSR would be after him. On France, Goldberg said Berard had said he still without final instructions. Caradon said he thought Nigeria would come along with UK.

5. Sisco conveyed to Caradon report from Rafael (Israel), who had just spoken to Gobbi (Argentina). Gobbi told Rafael Argentina under instructions to reach agreement with UK, that changes only in preamble would be satisfactory, and that LAs had no intention of touching UK language on rep’s mandate, withdrawal, navigation, or belligerency. Goldberg said if cosmetics in preamble only point at issue, he thought Israel would not object. It would be far better to have such change in UK text—with possibility that LAs would co-sponsor—than be faced with tabling of LA text. Pedersen urged that UK get LAs signed on and firmly committed to text with cosmetic changes so as to head off any further amendments—particularly addition of “all the” before territories which USSR and friends will push and which will be attractive to LAs because it more like LA text than UK text. Hope asked if letter from FonMin Brown to FonMin Costa Mendez (Argentina) would be helpful. Goldberg said this would be very helpful and Pedersen suggested such letters be sent to both LAs after UK meets with LAs AM Nov 18 and gets them committed to cosmetically modified text.

6. Re Arab attitude toward UK text, Caradon said Pachachi (Iraq) and Benhima (Morocco) had urged him to stick to current text. Goldberg said we have told Ruda that we have hard info that both sides would acquiesce in UK res, but that he has remained unconvinced.

7. Sisco said it clear further delay in SC exclusively Soviet ploy. In reply Caradon query as to USSR motive, Goldberg and Pedersen said Kuznetsov seemed basically bitter and that it may be Sovs desire keep pot boiling in ME, as well as prevent either US or UK (which also would be Western) political success in SC. Caradon asked what USSR would do on vote on UK text. Goldberg said he thought USSR would go along reluctantly by abstaining.

Goldberg

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to London, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Tokyo, and Addis Ababa. Received at 0608Z.