512. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1

2071. Goldberg and Eban concerted closely on tactics in SC now that both Indian and US res submitted and SC will convene Thurs2 afternoon. Sisco, Pedersen, and Rafael also present at conversation Nov 8.

Eban, a bit chagrined for having been away in London while fast moving situation unfolded yesterday, reported that both Wilson and Brown felt that US draft helped situation and helped UK get away from embarrassing situation re Indian text. However, certain softening changes were suggested to Eban in US formulation but Eban resisted them in London saying that if UK were to open up res this would require Israelis to seek further changes since res does not include concept of direct negotiations. Eban reported that Hussein had conveyed a sense of urgency in his London discussions. Eban believes UAR position has hardened in last few days and that Cairo is more intransigent than position taken here by Riad up to last Friday, when the latter made a sharp shift in full support of Indian res. Eban said Brown’s understanding of Hussein-Nasser agreement of Oct 17 is same as US. Eban found great speculation in London as to where Sovs fit into present situation, and what role they have played in change of position by UAR.

Goldberg said he found Riad a troubled man, that on the whole his tone has been moderate, but it seemed to change once we had talked to [Page 1010] King and had been encouraged to put down on paper our precise ideas on a res. Goldberg speculated Sovs have exercised their influence in situation, and also Cairo. Rafael reported very confidentially that Kuznetsov had told Riad on Sunday that, whatever the outcome, UAR should go ahead on Indian res. Sisco interjected that we found Kuznetsov very sensitive Sunday night re any piece of paper with American label on it.

Goldberg expressed regret that as a result of Israeli slow and negative reaction, we permitted the Indian res to be submitted first and achieve priority.3 Eban was obviously embarrassed and by implication indicated this had been a mistake on their part. Rafael later told Sisco Eban had bawled him out since he realized there may be two or three Council members who will be able to vote for both resolutions and a vote on American res first would have been advantageous.

Rafael confirmed our knowledge that Japanese are consulting informally on basis of a draft of their own,4 as a way of avoiding embarrassment re Indian draft. Israelis have been strongly discouraging Japanese from its submission. While agreeing Japanese should be discouraged, Pedersen opined that Arabs would not find Japanese text acceptable.

Goldberg underscored UK problem. We know Caradon has sent a compromise text to London, and is anxious to come out as great compromiser. In response to Eban’s query, Goldberg said he expected a great drive over next week to achieve a compromise res. Goldberg reported to Eban that both Rifai, Riad and Sovs have tried very hard to get us to negotiate on basis Indian draft, and we have categorically refused to use that text as basis. It was agreed that Eban would see Caradon promptly in order to keep the UK aboard and to discourage unhelpful initiatives and changes.

Rafael said American support would be greatest asset for any SC text. US therefore has enormous leverage since Arabs know that nothing [Page 1011] can get done diplomatically without US prestige being engaged. Both Eban and Goldberg felt that this point must be made explicitly clear to King. Both Eban and Rafael urged that Pres say to King this evening, that if Hussein wants help he must get behind American res promptly, that he must direct his reps at UN to work within this framework rather than the posture they have adopted of undermining the King’s efforts and giving impression to other dels that in effect Jordan is opposed to American text and in favor of Indian res. It was felt that if Pres could indicate that we are trying to get King the UN umbrella he wants in form of UN rep, as a means to starting dialogue, then word exercise going on at UN should come to a halt promptly and US res adopted. Important thing is that King know that US is prepared to help get him the best possible deal in any settlement, provided text is kind US can support.

Finally, it was agreed that Israeli efforts in capitals and at UN would be concentrated on preventing nine votes from being mobilized in favor of Indian text, but they would remain aloof from American draft as the best possible way not to prejudice support for it. Eban said they would do everything to create a “non-bandwagon psychology” for Indian res. It was agreed too that we would bore in with other dels on the idea that Arabs cannot be expected to achieve anything in way of reasonable settlement without having US aboard on a res.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to the White House and repeated Immediate to Tel Aviv, and to London. Received at 1835Z.
  2. November 9.
  3. Sisco told Rusk in a November 7 telephone conversation that Katzenbach had received White House approval to table the U.S. draft “but in circumstances where Israelis would say go ahead.” After the UAR called for a meeting of the Security Council that morning, Goldberg talked to the Israelis, who said the text was acceptable as a final agreed solution but not as a text to table. Goldberg requested the President’s approval to table it. (Notes of telephone conversation with Goldberg and Sisco prepared in Rusk’s office, November 7, 1:45 p.m.; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) Rostow told Rusk later that the President said Goldberg should use his judgment. (Notes of telephone conversation with Walt Rostow, November 7, 2:05 p.m.; ibid.) Telegram 2066 from USUN, November 8, reported Goldberg’s November 7 discussions on this subject with Rafael. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN)
  4. Telegram 2027 from USUN, November 7, cited in footnote 2, Document 511, also transmitted the text of an informal Japanese draft.