509. Memorandum for the Record1
- Hussein Visit and Security Council Situation
Messrs. Katzenbach, Battle, Sisco and Walsh met with the Secretary at 4:15 p.m. to discuss the Hussein visit and the situation in New York. It was reported to the Secretary that the USSR, Indians and the UAR were continuing to lobby for the Indian resolution. While we believe we can block this effort, we will have to move aggressively to do so. We will have messages ready this evening to go from the Secretary to the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Argentina and Ethiopia in an effort to persuade them from supporting the Indian resolution.2 In addition, the Secretary was informed [Page 1005]that Ambassador Goldberg and the group believe we should have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] urge King Hussein that, if he wants our resolution to pass, he should help head off the Indian resolution. If the King does not enter the fray, the snows will have fallen heavily before any resolution passes. In so doing, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should be authorized to reaffirm the assurances given the King on November 33 and by the Secretary in his private meeting with the King at 12:30 today (see attachment).4 The Secretary then authorized [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to reaffirm to the King that the Secretary had in fact incorporated into his remarks what Arthur Goldberg had told him on November 4.5
“Goldberg continued that we had tried to create terms of reference to move in two directions King had emphasized as requisites—specific withdrawal reference and operative provisions for guidance of special rep. Said that apart from res with such text, U.S. would do best it could to achieve these objectives, having regard to what he had told King about our views toward Jordan.”
The Secretary then summarized his private talk with the King along the following lines. The King, who was in a good mood, did most of the talking, touching on the basic problems in the area, such as refugees. The King’s reactions to the US draft resolution were favorable. The Secretary responded in general terms about the situation in the Middle East and in New York, incorporating Goldberg’s assurances on November 4 within the framework of his own comments. No details were discussed.
The Secretary was informed that Goldberg was leaning toward the tabling in the Security Council of the draft US resolution and the group could see advantages in such a course of action. This step might be taken as a preemptive move if it became likely that the Indian resolution would be tabled. It would be designed to show the Arabs what we stand for instead of merely what we oppose. It was pointed out that, since Goldberg may have to move fast, it would be desirable to obtain the President’s prior approval of such action. Joe Sisco assured the [Page 1006]Secretary that the resolution, which is an amalgam of the Indian, Danish and other drafts, had been carefully reviewed with the Israelis and that he and Arthur Goldberg were confident that they would go along with it. The Secretary then authorized the transmission of a memorandum on this subject to Walt Rostow for discussion with the President.
Deputy Executive Secretary
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis.↩
- The messages were sent in telegrams 65690 to Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro and 65691 to Addis Ababa, all dated November 7. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB–ISR) A message from Rusk to Indian Foreign Minister Indira Gandhi, urging India’s support for the U.S. draft resolution was sent in telegram 65734 to New Delhi, November 7. (Ibid.)↩
- Reference is to Goldberg’s November 3 conversation with the King; see Document 501.↩
- The attachment is a copy of a November 6 memorandum from Sisco to Rusk stating that Goldberg wanted Rusk to confirm to King Hussein the essence of what Goldberg had said to the King and summarizing what Goldberg had said. The summary states that the United States did not visualize a Jordan limited only to the East Bank and believed a settlement should involve the return of a substantial part of the West Bank to Jordan. It states that the United States could not guarantee the return of everything to Jordan but was prepared to give political and diplomatic support to a UN representative and that even with respect to Jerusalem, on which the U.S. position had differed from both Jordan and Israel, the United States would be prepared to do what was possible diplomatically to assure an appropriate role for Jordan.↩
- Reference is apparently to Goldberg’s November 3 conversation with the King. Their November 4 discussion, summarized in telegram 1991 from USUN, November 5 (see footnote 3, Document 503), was primarily concerned with the U.S. draft resolution, but the telegram states that at one point Goldberg referred to their conversation the previous day:↩