489. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
New York, October 26, 1967, 0142Z.
1742. Middle East.
- Goldberg reviewed current situation with Eban and Rafael morning Oct 25. Eban began by expressing great pleasure at his reception in Wash and gratification US stood by five principles announced by Pres July [June] 19. Sisco, Buffum and Pedersen also present.
- Without mentioning precise source of info, Goldberg said USSR told us directly they understood Israel deploying forces for attack on Jordan and Syria. We had indicated US had no such info. Eban said it is significant such reports coming directly from Sov Union but added mil attaches in Israel cld provide answer to this.
- Conversation then turned to negots on SC res. Goldberg
said today and tomorrow can prove critical in determining whether
successful outcome is possible. Tabor is trying his best and seems reliable.2 However LAs and Indians are not under
control and we are trying to steer the LAs toward the Danes. One
complicating factor is info that Russians are now proving more Arab
than the Arabs. Moreover, Jordan [Page 949] is proving tougher than UAR. Under circumstances we have foll basic choices:
- Sit by quietly and let LAs and Indians proceed; this wld not produce good res. Difficulty is that we cannot make LAs understand importance assuring that withdrawal clause wld be described “in context of peace”, which is the great protective phrase for Israel.
- Permit Tabor continue his efforts and hope he can achieve reasonable draft.
- Another possibility might be for US to take initiative and put in res. while keeping language on recognition of Israel’s right to exist as contained in earlier drafts, reasonable formulation on withdrawal in our view could be reference, in context of peace, to withdrawal from all territories occupied by it. We believe such formula would not prejudice Israel’s position and would not exclude boundary adjustments. Our policy on this matter has not changed.
- Eban said he would like to see what happened with the Danish effort. He had talked to Tabor this a.m. and felt he had properly inspired him with the need to have a draft that both sides could accept. While Goldberg said he did not want an immediate answer to the question about Israeli reaction to a possible US move along lines described, in para 3C, Eban commented that Israel would want to be absolutely sure that no action taken would prejudice her position on withdrawal, which was simply and clearly that they will not withdraw from all the territories they had occupied. He said that it was particularly important to Israel that the US should not support a proposition that prejudiced her position. He claimed that pressure by UN to get Israel back behind the June 5 lines would strengthen the hands of those in GOI who want to create fait accompli by annexation.
- It was left that Eban and Goldberg would consider matter further in light of progress made by Tabor.
- Later in morning Rafael informed Sisco that if SC res was passed which unacceptable to Israel on territorial-withdrawal point, he under instructions from cabinet to announce Israeli unwillingness to cooperate with UN rep.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv Priority, and to Jerusalem, Amman, London, Copenhagen, Ottawa, Moscow, and Paris.↩
- Telegram 1708 from USUN, October 25, reported a conversation on October 24 between Goldberg and Danish representative Tabor and conveyed the text of Tabor’s draft resolution. (Ibid.)↩