Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

460. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 10, 1967, 0235Z.

1303. Subj: Results of Goldberg-Caradon October 6 Meeting re ME. Ref: USUN’s 1302.²

1. Para 3 below contains text of “draft summary of agreed US–UK proposals resulting from Goldberg-Caradon talks on Middle East, October 6, 1967”.³ When advising Pedersen Oct. 9 of Caradon’s agreement to text and referendum, Hope (UK) stated Caradon had two reservations:

(A) He remains of view that, in any effort agreement on SC res, it best not to go beyond principles set down in US-Soviet draft of July or US–UK Washington working paper, without seeking to get agreement on specifics of those principles;

(B) Caradon is not satisfied with language in para 6 of text stating “withdrawal must be understood to mean withdrawal from occupied territories of UAR, Jordan and Syria …”. Hope said Caradon realizes this language is not meant to include Jerusalem and Gaza and would have preferred language such as “withdrawal from all occupied territories” (one of possible formulations which [emerged] during USUN-UKUN staff consultations of Oct. 7 and 9).

2. While Caradon has these reservations, we are convinced UK del as whole fully understands problems which would be involved in going ahead with effort to formulate principles for SC res such as those in US–USSR draft without agreement on their specifics.

3. Text of “draft summary” agreed to ad referendum to capitals as follows:

• “1. It is preferable to deal with ME item in the SC rather than in the GA, and as soon as agreement is reached on a common course of action.
• 2. Before we go to the SC the US, UK, USSR and France should have a uniform understanding of the meaning of the principles to be laid down by the SC and of the specific actions they envisage in accordance with these principles.
• 3. The US is prepared to pursue further conversations with the USSR to ascertain whether it stands on the correct text of version one of the US-Sov draft of July⁴ and whether it concurs in agreed interpretation of the text, or if not what conditions or reservations it has. This discussion would be open-ended on both parts so that if changes in the text were asked for by them, changes could also be asked for by the US without being subject by them to accusations of hardening its position.
• 4. An agreed text of version one of the US-Sov draft of late July, with the addition of a UN ref and adjusted to fit the SC (such as the UK-US Washington working paper), is an appropriate basis for discussions as to SC action. In addition to consultations with the USSR, Israel and the Arab states would have to be consulted to determine the acceptability of the proposed course of action, and their suggestions be given consideration.
• 5. It must be understood, both among the permanent members and among the parties, that para 2B of the US-Sov draft envisages in implementation affirmative actions to acknowledge Israel’s right to live in peace and security and to terminate belligerence, details of which would have to be worked out along the lines of para 9 below, but that such termination would mean, inter alia, that both Tiran Strait and Suez Canal would be open to ships of all states, including Israel.
• 6. Para 2A of that text referring to withdrawal must similarly be understood to mean withdrawal from occupied territories of the UAR, Jordan and Syria, details of which would have to be worked out along the lines of para 9 below, taking into account the peace and security problems mentioned in para 2B. (In discussing this with the USSR, the US would elucidate that demilitarized zones, possibly with UN supervision, and other possible arrangements and agreements are envisaged, and that it is anticipated that the armistice lines would be replaced by international boundaries.)
• 7. Desirable as it would be, it is not likely that the parties in the Middle East will commit themselves to specifics in advance of SC action; however, they must have the same understanding of the SC resolution as do the big four.
• 8. In addition to the private understanding by the parties of the meaning of the resolution, they would be expected to signify their commitment to it by publicly ‘accepting’ it after its adoption and agreeing to cooperate with the UN representative in its implementation.
• 9. The implementation of the principles in the resolution, and the details thereof, would be worked out between the parties with the assistance of a UN representative.
• 10. It is not at all certain that such an approach will be successful; if not, there should be a diligently pursued attempt to produce a resolution laying down more generalized Charter principles and an even-handed mandate for the dispatch of a UN representative to consult with the parties concerned, with a view to assisting in establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East (or even simply such a mandate).”

Goldberg

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. Telegram 1302 from USUN, October 10. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1278 from USUN, October 9, transmitted the text of an earlier version of this document, which it called “our version of ‘agreed minute’ of Goldberg-Caradon talks on Middle East, October 6, 1967.” (Ibid.)
4. Concerning the two versions of the U.S.-Soviet draft resolution, see Document 380 and footnote 2, Document 384. Telegram 1226 from USUN, October 5, reported that USUN had received the text of the U.S.-USSR resolution in the form it had been given to the Arabs by the USSR. The telegram states: “As we had previously speculated, USSR gave out version I and only para 2 thereof, without including preamble, op para I or op para 3. In para 2A they gave out words ‘to the positions they occupied before June 5, 1967’ instead of words ‘from territories now occupied by them.’” It also reported that C.P. Hope of the British delegation had told Pedersen that the Soviets had indeed given the Arabs the wrong version, but that they now had the full text. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR)