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  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967
  4. Document 351

351. Memorandum From Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff to Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff1

Washington, July 11, 1967.

SUBJECT

  • Intelligence Collaboration with Israel

REFERENCE

  • Memo dated July 8, 1967, from Mr. Saunders, subject same as above2

As you know, the attaches of various countries in Israel are kept under a very tight rein and shown only what the IDF wants them to see. The Americans get no special favors in this channel. Thus, particularly aggressive U.S. personnel feel frustrated.

There is a certain amount of gamesmanship between what the Israeli attaches are allowed to do here and what ours can do there.

There is also a slight resentment in a tightly disciplined country [1 line of source text not declassified].

In regard to captured Soviet equipment, I am informed that everything is on order [1 line of source text not declassified]. The Defense attaché, an eager beaver, is a capable officer, and his implication that there may be roadblocks apparently refers only to a larger project under consideration by the JCS to send a 12-man team for exploitation on the spot of both equipment and experience.

Meanwhile, the current relationship is proceeding with the reports and packaging of items for further study here, and I have no reason to believe that a thorough job will not be done and the benefits will be spread through the community.

I think the matter of the 12-man team should be left to the JCS, and it would be inappropriate of the White House to enter any pleas on its behalf at this time. You know the old saw, the job is being accomplished but a special task force will give it momentum, etc., etc., etc.

Peter Jessup3
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII. Top Secret. Also sent to Bundy and Rostow.↩
  2. Saunders’ memorandum states that he had learned that there was a large mine of intelligence information in the experience and the captured Soviet materiel that the Israelis had acquired during the recent fighting. The Defense Attaché had obtained agreement for a senior American team to go to Israel to take advantage of this but was afraid that road blocks would be thrown in its way. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Printed from a copy that indicates Jessup signed the original.↩