332. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1


  • The Situation in New York

As you know, yesterday the Yugoslavs presented their resolution calling for a simple Israeli withdrawal.2 With our support, Tabor is pressing for co-sponsors to present a milder version of our resolution3 this afternoon. He is trying to line up Norway, Brazil and Argentina as co-sponsors.

The tactical situation will then narrow down to a fight between the Yugoslav resolution and Tabor’s. Neither the Soviets nor we are expected to push the original resolutions to a vote. The Yugoslav resolution is expected to get 50 to 60 favorable votes and 25 to 30 “nay” votes. We shall have to scramble to prevent them from getting a two-thirds majority. Their resolution will be voted on first, perhaps as early as tomorrow, although there may be enough countries asking to explain their votes to result in the voting being pushed off until early next week. It is in our interest to push off the voting slightly in order to have more time to spear down negative votes. We have sent a circular cable throughout the world asking our Missions to make urgent representations in home capitals.4

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The Tabor resolution is likely to have 50 to 60 votes for and 35 to 40 “nay” votes. The opposition votes the other side can count on are a good deal firmer than ours. If both resolutions fail of two-thirds, the General Assembly is expected to start looking for a lower common denominator, such as a call to send a high-level mediator. In any case, the effort for settlement will go back to the Security Council.

There is an Arab-sponsored resolution focusing on Jerusalem that is likely to be pushed through to a quick vote. Its thrust is to declare that any Israeli measures to incorporate Jerusalem are regarded as “invalid.” Justice Goldberg and Joe Sisco are talking with other delegations about minor changes to soften the “invalid” declaration slightly. They have not yet recommended a position to Washington, but probably will propose that we vote in favor, regardless of the outcome of their efforts. The resolution is likely to pass overwhelmingly in any case.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VII. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bundy.
  2. The Yugoslav representative introduced a draft resolution sponsored by 15 countries on June 28. For text, see UN document A/L.522.
  3. The U.S. draft resolution, submitted on June 20, declared that the General Assembly’s objective was a stable and durable peace in the Middle East and called for achieving that objective through negotiated arrangements, with appropriate third-party assistance, based on (a) mutual recognition of the political independence and territorial integrity of all countries in the area, encompassing recognized boundaries and other arrangements, including disengagement and withdrawal of forces, that would give them security against terror, destruction and war; (b) freedom of innocent maritime passage; (c) a just and equitable solution of the refugee problem; (d) registration and limitation of arms shipments into the area; and (e) recognition of the right of all sovereign nations to exist in peace and security. For text, see UN document A/L.520; also printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1967, pp. 51–52.
  4. Circular telegram 218514, June 29, asked the 85 embassies to which it was sent to make an urgent approach at the highest appropriate level on the basis of the recommendations in telegram 5965 from USUN, June 29, which asked recipient embassies to approach the foreign ministries in their respective capitals and urge their support of a projected Western European–Latin American draft resolution and/or opposition to the Yugoslav draft resolution. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN)