Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

241. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 10, 1967, 0435Z.

5678. SC Mid-East Crisis. Ref: USUN 5672² and 5660, 5664,³ 5655.⁴

Fol covers origin and conclusions two SC mtgs June 9:

1. When Mellbin (Denmark) consulted with Pedersen at 7 a.m. re Syrian request for urgent meeting of SC June 9, Mellbin gave fol info: Rafael (Israel) had phoned Danes first at 5 a.m. and gave them essentially same info contained Tel Aviv 4026.⁵ Sometime after 6 a.m. Tomeh (Syria) phoned Danes to request urgent SC meeting since Syria under attack from Israel on ground and in air. Danes consulted SC members and meeting arranged for 10 a.m.

2. Given necessity prompt SC action reaffirm cease-fire and demand compliance of all parties, we considered various tactical possibilities including having Pres table short new draft res, updating longer substantive US draft already on table (USUN 5660, 5664), or offering amendment to Canadian draft (USUN 5655) which also before SC but with priority status. Demark decided it willing put forward text on behalf SC Pres (USUN 5672). When meeting time came Syrians told us they had text calling for cease-fire. We agreed to it with change in op para to refer both to Syria and Israel instead of just Israel. USSR then tried to get preambular para referring to fighting going on in Syria in vicinity Adl. We rejected this in meeting of USSR, Denmark, Syria and ourselves. (Comment: Sov intent apparently was to embarrass us for not being prepared at this point to embrace explicit mention of armistice lines.) Finally, after this drafting had cost two hours, Sovs agreed to text as proposed by Syrians, which unanimously adopted after statements by Syria and Israel.⁶ (See unclassified summary for SC meeting and USUN 5672 for text of res.)

3. SC reconvened after 7 p.m. in order hear latest SYG info on compliance with cease-fire. After lengthy discussion, in which Syrians cited news reports of Israeli advances and Sovs repeatedly stressed Israeli “aggression,” SYG suggested that parties cooperate to permit UNTSO establish facts. Suggestion by Goldberg and motions by Fedorenko (USSR), Caradon (UK), and Tine (France), led to formulation by SC Pres of proposal requesting Israel to make govt house available to Gen Bull and UNTSO, calling upon both parties to permit freedom of movement to Gen Bull and UNTSO observers, and requesting SYG to report info he receives from observers to SC, which adjourned until 10:30 a.m. tomorrow morning, June 10.

4. Sovs submitted ltr after mtg requesting inscription new item entitled (approximately) “on cessation of hostilities by Israel and on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab states”. After conversation with Amb Pedersen, Amb Tabor took up with UNSec question of whether to inscribe item “ltr from permrep of the Sov Union,” which would be preferable, or “ltr from permrep of Sov Union on cessation of hostilities by Israel and on withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab states,” which Sovs likely to press for. In anticipation this item, Sov continued exploring with other dels, including Japanese and French, possibility of simple withdrawal res. Shevchenko, to whom Sov permrep refers as his commissar, admitted to Plihon (France), however, that problem more complex than could be comprehended by simple withdrawal res.

5. Sov line appeared to harden during day with considerable emphasis placed by Sovs on communiqué of Moscow mtg key sentence of which read as fol: “If GOI does not stop aggression and withdraw its troops behind truce line, socialist states which signed this statement will do everything necessary to help the peoples of Arab countries to administer resolute rebuff to aggressor, to protect their lawful rights, and to extinguish hotbed of war in ME and restore peace in that area.” Rafael (Israel) remarked to Pedersen Sovs had taken disturbing line and seemed to want to put statements on record prior to some unspecified action.

Comment: Issue of simple withdrawal as opposed to withdrawal as part of over-all settlement will be main and somewhat tricky problem as soon as cease-fire firms up.

Goldberg

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN. Confidential; Priority. Received at 1:56 a.m. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC for POLAD, and CINCSTRIKE.
2. Telegram 5672 from USUN, June 9. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 5660 from USUN, June 8, transmitted text of a U.S. draft resolution introduced that afternoon. It called for scrupulous compliance with the cease-fire by Israel and Jordan; immediate compliance with the Council’s demands for a cease-fire by the other parties concerned; and discussions among the parties concerned, using such third party or UN assistance as they might wish, looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force, the maintenance of vital international rights, and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East. (Ibid.) Telegram 5664 from USUN, also June 8, transmitted amendments to the U.S. draft resolution. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 5655 from USUN, June 9. (Ibid.)
5. See footnote 2, Document 231.
6. Security Council Resolution 235 (1967); the text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 517–518.