Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, June 6, 1967, 9:41 p.m.

208748. For the Ambassador from the Secretary.

1. I believe that the GOI must look to its own interest in the Arab world. The presence of Jordan and the King has been a stabilizing influence which I do not believe the Israelis should lightly see go down the drain.

2. I hope you will find a way to suggest most forcefully to the Israelis that they arrange in the aftermath of the Security Council resolution an immediate cease-fire at least de facto with Jordan.² I leave to you the nature of the approach and caution you that we do not want to get in a position of trying to direct Israeli tactics, particularly military ones. In the light of unfounded charges of the last couple of days, any such implication would be dangerous indeed. I do, however, think you may be able carefully to handle this as a matter in interest to the Israelis (to say nothing of our own).

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL/27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Battle and approved by Rusk.
2. Telegram 4112 from Amman, June 6, received at 9:40 p.m., reported that Jordanian Prime Minister Juma had telephoned to request U.S. good offices in advising the Israelis that the Jordanian Government desired an immediate cease-fire. (Ibid.) Telegram 208784 to Tel Aviv and Amman, June 6, instructed the Embassy in Tel Aviv to convey this information to the Israeli Government and instructed the Embassy in Amman to inform the Prime Minister and express the hope that the Jordanian Government could notify the United Nations officially at an early date of its acceptance of a cease-fire. (Ibid.)