Office of the Historian

174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1

Washington, June 6, 1967, 8:55 a.m.

208438. Amman’s 4095.2 You should inform GOI of Jordanian desire for immediate cease-fire and urge GOI that it would be in their interest to make necessary arrangements immediately and directly rather than through UN. This would split Jordan off from other Arab states. It may be preferable that cease-fire remain secret temporarily if King is to maintain control.3

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Under Secretary of State Katzenbach and approved for transmission by Deputy Executive Secretary Herbert B. Thompson. Repeated Flash to Amman.↩
  2. Telegram 4095 from Amman, June 6, reported that King Hussein had asked the British, French, U.S., and Soviet Ambassadors to arrange a cease-fire, either acting unilaterally or through the United Nations. He said UAR Commander of the Jordanian Army General Riyadh, (Lieutenant General Munim Riyadh), told him he had three alternatives: cease-fire, military evacuation of the West Bank, or continued fighting with loss of the West Bank. When Burns returned to the Embassy, the Prime Minister called to say without an immediate cease-fire, they would be unable to maintain law and order in Jordan. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Telegram 3967 from Tel Aviv, June 6, reported that Barbour had passed the message to the Prime Minister and had urged Israeli acceptance, arguing the need to end the bloodshed. Barbour commented that because of Jordan’s initiation of hostilities in Jerusalem and attacks on civilian areas, it was probably too late to arouse any Israeli interest in preserving King Hussein’s regime. (Ibid.)↩