83. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
92. From Acheson.2 We had amicable hour and quarter meeting this morning with Erim and Alacam. I began by suggesting we consider Turkey’s security needs with regard to Cyprus. I mentioned possibility Turkish base on Karpas Peninsula. Erim countered by putting forward Turkey’s desired partition line, enclosing whole northern part of island [Page 180] and went on to give us standard Turkish position: that first Turkish demand was implementation London-Zurich Agreements and that failing this Turkey could only consider partition or federalism. We tried to point out probable impracticality of achieving any of these.
I touched on probable great cost to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots of solution which Turks would have to impose by force. Erim then took new tack, saying that after all Turkey could let Greece effect enosis as fait accompli, without fighting Greece, but refuse to recognize it and maintain continuing pressures against Greece in hope situation would change for better. I expressed great doubts Turkey’s position would improve under such circumstances.
Speaking next about Turkey’s concern for welfare Turk-Cypriots we broached idea that this might be taken care of without partition and within context of enosis. For example, I said, there could be a Turkish base large enough to be safe haven for those Turks unwilling to live under Greek rule, while for the other Turks a special semi-autonomous regime could be set up. This might comprise one or more areas where Turks were in majority (such as strip from northern Nicosia to Kyrenia) which would be administered directly by Turkish local authorities: for those areas where Turks remained in minority, there might still be arrangement whereby a Turk-Cypriot authority would nevertheless control and administer local affairs of Turkish villagers.
Erim seemed intrigued with this idea and said he would like to think about it. He asked whether base-safe haven area would be sovereign Turkish territory, a part of Turkey. We stretched matter a bit and said yes. He then suggested it would be desirable for a Turkish military expert come here to discuss what would be needed on Cyprus to protect Turkey from military point of view. Proposed to send for General Sunalp. I raised no objection.3
Erim flatly admitted Turks were going to expel Greeks from Turkey at end six-month period following denunciation of treaty as reprisal for Greek policies toward Cypriots. He further strongly indicated that Patriarchate would also be expelled, even though Turk Government had nothing special against Athenagoros. I said that expulsion of Greeks was not sufficient lever to affect Cyprus question at present. It would be more sensible to keep this weapon in reserve to be used in reprisal if Greeks later failed live up to guarantees they might give Turk Cypriots.
When we were discussing Turkish security problem, Erim particularly pointed out location of Kastellorizon. I asked if Turkey’s security would be improved if it had this island, and he said that it would. At [Page 181] another juncture, Erim referred to remarks made to him while in Washington that possibly Greek islands of Lesvos, Samos or Kos might be ceded as compensation for Cyprus. We rather threw cold water on this. I do think, however, that his apparent interest in Kastellorizon may have some significance.
Expect to see Turks again early next week.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis.↩
- On July 4, the Department of State announced that Acheson would go to Geneva at the President’s request to provide assistance in helping to resolve the Cyprus crisis. Acheson held his first meeting with Turkish representatives on July 9.↩
- In telegram 96 from Geneva, July 13, Acheson reported that he had put forward a scheme for a semi-autonomous Turkish area that would not require geographic division. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)↩