79. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State 1
1422. Re Deptel 978.2 In hour-long conversation with President this morning we discussed number of subjects, principal among them the problem of Tylliria area and Grivas return. (Latter covered in separate telegram.)3
Conversation opened by my reference to recent Washington talks in which I followed point by point suggestions outlined reftel 978. I made special point of fact that my reason for bringing up subject of Tylliria was with reference to present delicate situation outlined to me by my old friend Galo Plaza and General Gyani. As in past I was again urging restraint and patience since any dramatic development might well bring on new Turkish move which we might not be in a position stop again.
In response Makarios said first of all we should not read too much into his statement to Associated Press.4 His purpose had been to avoid possible adverse reaction to “expected failure” of Washington talks, hence his effort to play them down while at same time making clear that any decisions regarding future of Cyprus would have to be submitted to Cypriots and could not be result merely of talks between other countries. Said he quite understood US effort in context of over-all UNSYG attempt to find satisfactory solution but he wondered whether failure of Pres Johnson’s [Page 169] efforts had not perhaps left situation worse than it had been two weeks ago. I told him that although matter would be kept confidential for obvious reason we understood Mediator had some further thoughts regarding possibility of further consultations among parties concerned (I did not mention any US involvement and he would presumably be hearing from Tuomioja upon his return). Makarios went on to make surprise statement that in any bilateral talks that might develop with Turkey, Greek Government could only discuss solutions on the basis of enosis of Cyprus with Greece and that any solution other than enosis and/or complete independence could only be reached with participation of Cypriot representatives. (This would seem to explain Papandreou’s refusal consider any possible divergences from these two principles.)
Archbishop said that both Plaza and Gyani had called to impress on him need for patience and restraint but said he had told them that although he would not use armed force that the status quo could not continue indefinitely. He said he had feeling UN would consider its job well done in next three months if it could say that not a shot had been fired. Naturally this was most commendable aim but without some progress on political front basic tensions at least on Greek side could hardly be reduced. Some change would have to come before the end of the year when economic and political pressures would be severe.
President went on to say he could understand our apprehension regarding the present tense situation particularly with regard to possible Turkish intervention and all that would imply. Said he could assure me that for their part Greek Cypriots would not use force unless attacked. They were however giving serious consideration to use of other pressures which he had enumerated to me previously and he again said that if freedom of movement not restored in presently Turkish-held areas, his govt would be forced to deny freedom of movement to Turkish Cypriots.
I expressed gratification at this indication that Greek Cypriot side would do nothing to create a new crisis through military action and I urged him to give very careful consideration to nature of other pressures which he might feel were required in order not to bring on new danger of Turkish intervention which this time we might find even more difficult if not impossible to prevent. Although I had made it quite clear that US could not contemplate hostilities with an ally over Cyprus problem I am not convinced that Archbishop has accepted this as cold fact of situation.
President was more relaxed than during last meeting and seemed much less militant in his declarations of need for progress on political front. Perhaps UN reps plus Greek Amb Delivanis plus our representations have had some effect.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TUG. Repeated to USUN.↩
- Telegram 978 to Nicosia, June 28, instructed Belcher to convey to Makarios the reality of the danger of a Turkish intervention and the likelihood that the United States would be unable to deter such action. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 1427 from Nicosia, June 30. (Ibid.)↩
- Apparent reference to Makarios’ rejection of the U.S. offer to provide assistance to the U.N. Mediator.↩