Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

75. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 24, 1964, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Cyprus Situation and Greek-Turkish Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Under Secretary
  • Dean Acheson, Former Secretary of State
  • Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
  • Maxwell Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • Ambassador Henry Labouisse
  • John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • George S. Springsteen, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary
• Greece
  • Prime Minister Papandreou
  • Foreign Minister Costopoulos
  • Andreas Papandreou, Minister Alternate of Economic Coordination
  • Ambassador Alexander A. Matsas

Under Secretary Ball referred to President Johnson’s proposal of that morning that Greek and Turkish representatives meet quietly with Dean Acheson to try to arrive at some agreement on the main issues in the Cyprus crisis.² In making this suggestion, the President did not intend that the U.S. replace the UN mediator. Rather, the mediator himself had realized he had come to an impasse and asked us to use our good offices. The U.S. agrees with the Prime Minister’s remark that a breakdown of these proposed talks would lead to a dangerous situation, but we are also convinced that serious danger exists now, and so negotiations are essential.

Mr. Ball continued that there are two elements in the problem: (1) to negotiate a just solution and (2) to do so in a way which will prevent irresponsible forces from taking over Cyprus. He said Greece and Turkey are thinking along the same lines; and so now is the time to talk about procedures which serve everyone’s interests. Mr. Ball added that the day before the Americans had taken a strong line with Turkish Prime Minister Inonu. Turkey now recognizes that a new basis for Cyprus must be negotiated.

The Prime Minister commented that the first requirement is security on Cyprus. Greece is trying to establish security; Turkey must try also. He said the Cypriots must then have an opportunity to exercise self-determination. Under any final arrangements, there would of course be guarantees for the Turk-Cypriots.

The Prime Minister said NATO needs a new principle: no member has the right to begin war against another. He continued that Turkey’s former right of intervention is not valid now that Cyprus is covered by the UN Charter. If there is no danger to the Turk-Cypriot community, then Turkey’s argument on the need to intervene collapses. As for solutions, Turkey suggests partition or federation, neither of which is anyone’s interest, including Turkey’s. The Prime Minister said partition would lead the non-Turkish part of the island into becoming another Cuba, and thus a grave danger to Turkey’s security. The other proposal, federation, would lead to civil war. The Prime Minister concluded that the only possible solution is unrestricted independence. This would be followed by a plebiscite and enosis, a solution which is certainly in the free world’s interests. Turkey would lose nothing and would in fact gain security. The Turkish-Cypriots would be protected just as are the Thracian Turks now. Prime Minister Papandreou said Greece would also be willing to offer international guarantees for the Turkish minority. The Cyprus crisis had now moved into the context of East-West rivalries, and the Prime Minister said he could not always exclude contacts by Makarios with the USSR.

Mr. Ball replied that he must question the Prime Minister’s statement that NATO should oppose war between two members. He said he was certain that no NATO country would oppose Turkey if it tried to enforce its treaty rights on Cyprus. As for the United States, the President had said in the morning we would not fight an ally in a situation as complicated as this. The Under Secretary said we will not interpose the Sixth Fleet. The U.S. would certainly attempt to dissuade Turkey, but not by the use of force. With this background, he concluded, it is obvious that the talks as suggested by President Johnson are essential to avert danger and permit the mediator to get on with his work.

Prime Minister Papandreou said that this line of thinking leaves no conclusion but war. In a conflict between the old agreements and unrestricted independence, there is no bridge. Sooner or later Turkey will go to war, although he said he would be happy if his pessimism were shown to be unfounded. Turkey is too weak now to bridge this gap, and so there is no need for the Prime Minister to meet with Inonu. Rather the better approach would be to wait for the mediator’s report. Perhaps by the process of elimination and with the passage of time, we may find a way. For the moment, the Prime Minister said he thought Greece and Turkey should undertake a reconnaissance to see whether future negotiations are possible; if so, then the real talks might begin.

The Under Secretary said it would be a mistake to limit action to keeping the peace on Cyprus while awaiting the mediator’s report. We would only be deceiving ourselves, because if there is no progress, we could not expect the GOT to restrain the activist forces in Turkey.

Mr. Ball continued that what the Prime Minister suggests is an exploration—that is, a Greek representative, Professor Erim of Turkey, and Mr. Acheson would meet to explore quietly the possibilities of some kind of action and to narrow the differences between the two sides. During that interval, Turkey would attempt to keep the Turk-Cypriots quiet. We would certainly fear the consequences should we have to tell Prime Minister Inonu that, despite his desisting from military action, we had been unable to arrange any useful alternative.

Prime Minister Papandreou repeated that the GOG would be willing to begin exploratory talks with Turkey. If there appeared to be room for talks he would then appoint someone for real negotiations, but given the present positions of the two Governments, there is little point at present of undertaking actual negotiations. Even though Greece and Turkey may be close now, there must first be cautious preliminary contact.

On Mr. Ball’s invitation Mr. Acheson commented that in insisting that there be peace on Cyprus before serious negotiations, the Prime Minister was raising the old chicken-egg question. He asked whether any pacification is possible until the views of Turkey and Greece are closer than they are now. Mr Acheson said no solution can fully satisfy both parties, but what is important is maintaining peace. He said the Prime Minister speaks of principles and theory, but as Mr. Acheson grows older, he believes more and more that general principles do not decide specific cases. The Prime Minister’s suggestion would place the talks in too narrow a framework. There must be more room for flexibility.

The Prime Minister replied that in this case the principle comes from a concrete case on which he had generalized. The point is, he said, that if the impression is given that negotiations are underway and they then fail, there would certainly be trouble. So there must be a reconnaissance first. He said he defended the principle of self-determination. If he did not, the Greek-Cypriots would follow their own way, and he could not influence them. If the United States thinks negotiations are possible, does it have an opinion about a final solution?

The Under Secretary replied that Prime Minister Inonu had asked a similar question and Mr. Ball’s answer now would be the same: any USG-sponsored solution would be condemned to failure. But in the course of Mr. Acheson’s talks he could evoke certain points of view, and he might then be able to say that A is better than B. Mr. Ball turned to self-determination, saying that the USG had long advanced such an approach to international problems, but, in looking at Cyprus, there are a number of elements of which self-determination is only one. He said Mr. Acheson would try to identify all of the elements on each side. If we do not do something, America’s influence over the GOT would rapidly dissipate, and the consequences could be terrifying. Mr. McNamara and General Taylor are here to discuss these possible consequences.

The Prime Minister said the GOG has great esteem for Mr. Acheson and accepts in principle his offer to make contacts on both sides. If, after these contacts, Mr. Acheson thinks actual negotiations would be useful, then the Prime Minister would appoint a representative.

Mr. Acheson said there are several elements immediately obvious. One is that of prestige and dignity. No solution can humiliate either side; nor can it be a complete victory for either side. Secondly, is the question of security, which concerns Turkey more than Greece. Therefore, the GOG should be sympathetic on this issue. Next come the people of Cyprus. The Prime Minister has said this element is more important to Greece, but actually it is also important to Turkey.

Prime Minister Papandreou said he was glad Mr. Acheson had included the Cypriot people in his listing. The greatest weight must be given to that element—its rights to a majority decision and its right to appeal to the UN. He said he also agreed that the security element is more significant for Turkey. He continued, however, that Mr. Acheson must be aware that the Greek starting position for any negotiations is unrestricted independence for Cyprus.

Mr. Ball commented that this would be a negotiation beginning with the conclusion and, therefore, would not be a negotiation at all.

Mr. Acheson said the purpose of two-party negotiations is not to take an unchangeable stand, but rather to see what can be accomplished. If the GOG sticks to its position, the GOT will not change its views about the binding validity of the present treaties and Turkey’s resulting right of intervention.

Prime Minister Papandreou insisted that there is no alternative to unrestricted independence. Mr. Ball replied that he agrees the present system on Cyprus has not worked. We must search for others. There are dangerous forces at work, and we must be practical; as the President said during the morning meeting, the USG cannot make moral judgements on this crisis. We are in a grey area in which neither Cypriot community has met 20th Century moral standards. The only choice is a compromise solution.

The Prime Minister concluded that he had expressed his views and heard those of the Americans. He would give his reply to their proposals before leaving Washington.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Greene and approved in U on August 10. The meeting was held aboard the Presidential yacht S.S. Sequoia on the Potomac River.
2. See Document 74.
3. For text of the joint communiqué issued on June 25 by President Johnson and Prime Minister Papandreou, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 582–583.