Office of the Historian

73. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, June 23, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

  • (See attached list on page 4)2

Mr. Ball opened the main conversation by saying that the United States did not want to put forward a formal solution for the Cyprus problem [Page 149] but to start by identifying the elements of a possible solution. The Turks, he said think that double enosis would be the best answer whereas the Greeks think that enosis is the solution. For the United States to say now that either of these or certain modifications of either was to be preferred would not be useful. He hoped that Mr. Acheson could push matters forward during the anticipated detailed discussions to come later and that at some time in the future we might then decide to propose something specific to the parties.

Mr. Acheson said he did not consider that these discussions should be regarded as a “lawyer’s dispute”. There was no sense in simply trying to score points on each other. This was not the way to make progress. Rather, it would be wiser to explore separately the vital elements which each country had at stake in this issue. For example, Turkey seemed to have three major concerns:

1)
Turkey’s national dignity and prestige;
2)
Turkey’s physical security, the question of the degree to which Cyprus in unfriendly hands would be a menace to Turkey;
3)
The welfare of the Turkish Cypriots, the security of their lives and property. (He remarked that when the crisis arose this last concern had seemed to be Turkey’s principal worry, but he thought now it had receded into third place.)

Similarly, Mr. Acheson would propose to ask the Greeks to consider what was vital to their national interests, not merely what they would like to have. After doing this with both parties, he would propose that they try to develop a solution from these bases, instead of starting with broad concepts like enosis and double enosis. After these first steps, Mr. Acheson suggested all concerned must decide how to handle Archbishop Makarios and the Cypriots, who were somewhat less than responsible.

Dr. Erim3 commented that Mr. Acheson’s proposed method was a rational approach to a final solution but that the question remained how to preserve security on the Island until a solution could be reached. Mr. Ball replied that a condition to the talks must be that both Ankara and Athens would exert every effort to keep things quiet on the Island. Mr. Acheson added that he hoped the discussions would be very short and the security problem would not be with us for long. Dr. Erim said we could not count on a quick solution, to which Mr. Ball replied that we must not start with the expectation that the talks would be protracted, [Page 150] the situation was too urgent. Mr. Ball foresaw three problems during the talks:

1)
Maintenance of security on the Island;
2)
Possible disruptive activities by Makarios;
3)
Possible Communist activity.

Therefore, we must hurry things along. Mr. Acheson concurred heartily, stressing that the present state of affairs would not permit long negotiations of the type which eventually resulted in the Austrian State Treaty; the situation was too explosive. Foreign Minister Erkin interjected that even next week we might have a moral collapse of Turkish Cypriots.

Mr. Ball said that we would like to have the talks begin right after July 4th. There was no dissent. He also suggested that Camp David would be the best site for the talks. Again there was no dissent.

Erkin urged that we try to make sure the Greeks don’t leak news of our plan to Makarios. Mr. Ball said we would do our best but could not guarantee anything.

At various times during the conversation, Turkish representatives voiced special concern not only about the general prospect for security on the Island but also about the situation of the displaced Turkish Cypriots who had left their homes. They asserted that relief for these people had been inadequate and that they were living in a state of dire need. Further, the British relief agencies would be withdrawing from the picture at the end of this month. The American side expressed belief that the International Red Cross would carry forward. The Turks expressed doubts on this and pointed out that the IRC can work only through the local government; if the local government were not willing to cooperate, nothing would be done. The American side gave general assurances of support for the relief effort.

The Turks further asserted that the Greek-Cypriot authorities were threatening to prevent the resupplying of the Turkish Army contingents on Cyprus and that this unit would soon exhaust its present stocks. They asked for American help on this problem, which was promised.

Most of the balance of the discussion was concerned with the wording of the joint communiqué. The text of the final draft as issued is attached.4

At one point Mr. Ball asked how the Turks interpreted the return of General Grivas to Cyprus. Erkin commented that it was not a good sign from a Turkish point of view, and others made similar remarks, but there [Page 151] was no noticeable excitement or special disturbance on the part of the Turks.

Summary: The conversation confirmed agreement on the following points:

1)
Provided the Greek Government also agreed, Turkey would participate in secret talks with the Greeks and Mr. Acheson directed toward agreement on a final and permanent solution of the Cyprus dispute.
2)
These talks should begin at Camp David promptly after July 4th.
3)
The Turkish representative would be Dr. Nihat Erim. (Dr. Erim remarked that he was scheduled to come to the United States later this summer on a leader grant and that this could be given as the reason for his return here when he came for the talks.)
4)
In the meantime, the United States would do its best to assist in assuring the welfare of the Turkish-Cypriot refugees.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2415. Secret; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Jernegan and approved in U on July 13. The meeting was held during a luncheon aboard the Presidential yacht S.S. Sequoia on the Potomac River.↩
  2. Not printed. Prime Minister Inonu, Foreign Minister Erkin, and Ambassador Menemencioglu were accompanied by five Turkish officials. Under Secretary of State Ball and former Secretary of State Acheson were accompanied by Talbot, Jernegan, and Springsteen.↩
  3. Dr. Nihat Erim, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Turkish National Assembly.↩
  4. Not printed. For text of the joint communiqué issued on June 23, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 582.↩