56. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1
1322. Ankara tel sent Dept 1609.2 Latest Turkish invasion threat may well be climax of Cyprus crisis. Our acceptance of larger measure of responsibility for efforts find solution can be significant new element in problem. Whether our deeper involvement was precalculated objective of Turkish exercise or only way Turks could find out of impasse is not yet clear, but in either case we should seize resulting situation as opportunity to be exploited to fullest in effort achieve lasting settlement.
In planning role we are to play, I would hope Dept shares our belief it essential we keep eye on political, economic and demographic facts of life and avoid being drawn into quid pro quo with Turks which would involve our support of a Turk Cypriot solution in exchange for their agreement not to intervene.
June 5 exercise in Ankara may have been designed in part to take Inonu off hook politically and shift blame for Turkish inaction to us. In itself, this is not bad. We can accept that onus, but we must be wary of dangers of going beyond this possibly becoming involved in support of an unrealistic plan for federation or in giving some general assurance of support which could be interpreted as guaranteeing Turkish satisfaction in Cyprus.
GOT has called for us to become substantively involved. In so doing we must play it straight with GOT, pulling no punches in our analysis that the facts clearly require an essentially Greek solution, that partition or federation is anathema to 80 percent of population and therefore politically and practically infeasible, and that the prime problem will be to devise arrangements to give maximum protection to Turk Cypriot and GOT security interests. This is moment to grasp nettle and tell GOT plainly we believe security interests would best be insured by association of Cyprus with Greece—a NATO ally, a more mature and responsible state, and one whose interests are in no way served by perpetuation of difficulties with Turkey.
We can no longer remain on sidelines, expressing hope for solution satisfactory to both sides. There is no such solution. Unitary, Greek-run [Page 113] state, closely associated with Greece (perhaps with defense, foreign affairs and guarantees of minority rights left in hands of GOG) would offer following palpable advantages:
- 1.
- It should be acceptable to majority of Cyprus population.
- 2.
- It would allow us at least in Security Council and elsewhere to displace solution as defender of justice on Cyprus (c.f. my letter to Jernegan), thus stemming dangerous slide to the left here.
- 3.
- It would provide best guarantee available for security both of Turk Cypriots and Turkey, bringing island within NATO sphere and removing motive for further equivocating GOC role re East and West which has so encouraged growth of Communist influence on island.
- 4.
- It should contribute to improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, as GOG would have every reason to assure Turk Cypriot rights and reestablishment law and order on Cyprus. Partition, federation or hermaphrodite London-Zurich type solution would only guarantee continuing trouble on Cyprus.
Would seem that situation resulting from most recent crisis gives opportunity for new initiative in effort end once and for all this problem so fraught with danger to US and our allies, not to mention people of Cyprus.
If Inonu accepts invitation or if UK-US consultations considered advisable, I believe situation on island such that I could be available for consultation in connection therewith.
Foregoing dictated prior to Tuomioja meeting reported following telegram, but substance that meeting only supports above thesis.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, USUN, and Paris for Under Secretary Ball and USRO. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, and CIA. Ball visited Paris and London for meetings with President de Gaulle and senior British officials, and Geneva for a speech to the International Trade Conference June 4–7.↩
- Document 55.↩
- Belcher reported on his meeting with Tuomioja in telegram 1323 from Nicosia, June 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)↩