374. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Secretary’s Meeting with King Constantine
PARTICIPANTS
- King Constantine
- H. E. Panayiotis Pipinelis, Greek Foreign Minister
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Ridgway B. Knight
- Mr. Frank E. Cash, Jr., Country Director for Turkey
The King began by saying he welcomed the opportunity to discuss once more “the relations between our two countries.” The constitution is a new development, and the question is where we go from here—what steps should be taken to encourage a return to “the right kind of system.” He wondered what ideas The Secretary had as to how to promote the [Page 773] return to at least the form of representative government as soon as possible. The King said he thought it would be impossible to go from the present system immediately to democratic government. This must be done gradually, but the process must be started soon. He would welcome The Secretary’s ideas as to how to get the constitution into effect as soon as possible.
The Secretary said that although the United States has a great interest in this, he was not sure we had any recommendations as to how this should be done. He asked the Foreign Minister what plans existed.
Mr. Pipinelis replied that he had been in the hospital and unable to talk with the Prime Minister recently, but the latter clearly had the aim of reaching full implementation of the constitution by gradual and well-considered steps. Naturally there would be many, and the Finance Minister, who had attended the Cabinet meeting concerned, reported that the first very wise step has been taken in the appointment of a committee to draft the laws necessary to implement the constitution—a press law, a political parties law, a constitutional tribunal law, etc. After examination by the Cabinet, the laws will be put into effect at once, parties must be set up, and elections prepared. In his personal opinion, the Foreign Minister said, the most urgent matter now is the return of His Majesty, “not on formal grounds, but for political and psychological grounds.” His presence would lend a new element of stability and enable His Majesty to exercise very important influence, which is essential. He expressed his personal conviction that the Prime Minister agreed with this idea completely, but that he had differences to contend with. No one influence is entirely predominant.
Here the King interjected, “Unfortunately!”
Mr. Pipinelis agreed and added that the Prime Minister’s group, both inside the Government and without, is becoming predominant but is not entirely so yet. The Foreign Minister said he tried to find a way out. He supported the Prime Minister completely and is convinced the King’s return will be advantageous to all. “Your advice,” he said, “and your country’s would be invaluable.” “A formal démarche,” he continued, “could do more harm than good, but you have a series of means to make your views known.”
In response to The Secretary’s question as to whether the differences he had mentioned were within the Cabinet or without, the Foreign Minister said “both”, and the King said “mainly without.”
Mr. Pipinelis said he knew how much importance the people—the revolutionary committee, and the people in general, attach to the opinion of the United States Government. He knew the United States had many official and unofficial contacts.
“You are aware,” the King said, “of my planned meeting last May with the Prime Minister. Due to one thing and another, this has been postponed. [Page 774] It is very hard to know what is in his mind. I have told him through various people that it is far better to become master in his own house. I think he can’t deal with the young people, who are tough. Immediately upon my return I’ll work as hard as possible to get rid of them.”
The Secretary asked where it had been contemplated the meeting would be held. The King said near Levkas, with the Prime Minister anchored in one cove and the King in another, with the meeting in between at night.
The United States, the King continued, carries great weight, but it’s hard to tell how long this will last. It was very encouraging to hear that the drafting committee has been appointed, but the question is whether there will be delays.
Mr. Pipinelis said he did not think so. He was very happy that the committee had been appointed without his urging. The Prime Minister clearly intends to put the entire constitution into effect, but he is not alone. He has influence, but he must bargain. We have no alternative, the Foreign Minister said, but normalization through this Government and the return of His Majesty.
The King said he agreed, and both he and Mr. Pipinelis, and perhaps the United States, might exercise influence.
Mr. Pipinelis said he could safely say that with the King in Greece the possibilities would increase. The King initially should do nothing except permit his influence to grow.
The King laughingly said he’d play tennis.
Mr. Pipinelis said the King’s influence would grow and become very important. The present Government is there to stay. It can be influenced but not thrown out without strife.
The Secretary said he had a few observations to make. During his tenure as Secretary there have been sixty-two coups in the world, none of which, he might say, had been engineered by the CIA. Wherever the United States has had influence, it has always been exerted toward return to constitutionalism. The United States has acquired a certain amount of experience in this area. Frequently there are two stages. First there is a restoration of basic civil rights and fair administration of justice, a removal of the fear of oppression, and this leads to the second stage, which, while not constitutionalism, is not totalitarian in its effect on individuals. An important step in Greece would seem to be the return of basic civil rights to prepare the way for constitutional elections.
As to the King’s return, The Secretary said, he would be very candid. He could not, as a man of honor, advise the King to return, because to do so would imply assurances, which no one had given The Secretary. He could not make pledges he was unable to fulfill. He would not advise the King either to return, or not to return. The King should know to what he [Page 775] was returning. The Secretary could not advise the King to return to a trap.
Mr. Pipinelis said the purpose was to get advice to the revolutionary committee, not the King, who would have to make his own decisions.
The Secretary asked how much reliance the United States could put in assurances from the revolutionary committee concerning the King’s return.
Mr. Pipinelis said it was not intended that the United States get assurances but rather that it give advice.
In response to The Secretary’s question as to how much influence the United States could exert on the revolutionary committee, the Foreign Minister said, “considerable if properly done.”
The King said it would be effective if Americans outside the Embassy “talked directly to the Colonels.”
The Foreign Minister said there were also many other channels.
The King said he agreed The Secretary should not give him advice. He would make his own decisions. But the United States now has influence on the Colonels which may be lost in a year. Results would come from constant pressure on individual colonels for the return of constitutionalism and the King, because they always have in mind what the United States is thinking.
The Secretary said there was no question but that the United States would be glad to see the return to Greece of constitutional democracy, governmental stability, and progress. This advice, the United States has been giving and will continue to give. But in complete candor, the United States could not get involved in what might turn out to be a doublecross.
The King said he did not want his return discussed alone. The real issue is what happens to Greece. “I’m terribly homesick”, he said, “but the important thing is, are the people going to get a better deal. I failed to push this Government out by force. Influence is the only possibility. We must persuade them to do the right thing. Then we must see if it’s a trap—if I’m going back only as a puppet. It is very important that we— Mr. Pipinelis, the American Government, and I—press for the earliest possible return to constitutionalism. I have to go back to help the process. I’m absolutely confident of the loyalty of the people, but I’m worried about discipline in the armed forces.”
The Secretary asked if there were any possibility of starting with local elections.
The Foreign Minister said this was the course he favored.
The King asked if The Secretary agreed that all should exert pressure on the regime and then see if a trap had been laid.
The Secretary said he would review this when he returned to Washington. There was no question but that the United States would be very [Page 776] glad to see Greece move quickly back to a constitutional system. However, it would not be the first time United States advice had been disregarded.
The King said he was “immensely worried about the armed forces.” He was going to tell the armed forces chief that he fully supported his attempts to reinstill discipline. The captains are still ruling the colonels, and the colonels, the generals. There is still dissension between the forces. The armed forces must again earn the respect of the people.
The King said he hoped the United States Government and the new Administration would continue to have no dealings with the Regent, whom the King does not recognize.
In conclusion, the King said a determination would have to be made at some point as to whether or not attempts to exert influence on the regime were being successful. Allowing the situation to continue indefinitely would simply help the Communists, because eventually there would be an explosion.
The Secretary said this matter would be considered very carefully. He was inclined to agree that conditions could not be frozen, because this would be very dangerous. He hoped very much to see fast movement toward constitutional government and wished the King good luck.
The King and The Secretary then had a brief chat alone.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 GREECE. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cash and approved in S on November 22. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy. Rusk was in Brussels November 12–16 for the NATO Ministerial Meeting. In telegram 7697 from Athens, November 5, Talbot endorsed the idea of a meeting between Rusk and the King to demonstrate continued U.S. interest in the King. (Ibid.)↩
- No record of this conversation has been found.↩