359. Memorandum for the Record1

SUBJECT

  • NSC Meeting Held January 24, 1968, at 1:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • The Vice President
  • Secretary of State, Dean Rusk
  • Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara
  • Secretary of Treasury, Henry H. Fowler
  • Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler
  • Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms
  • Director, U.S. Information Agency, Leonard Marks
  • Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus R. Vance
  • Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach
  • Under Secretary of Defense, Paul Nitze
  • Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco
  • Assistant Secretary of State, Lucius D. Battle
  • President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Mr. Walt Rostow
  • Executive Secretary, Mr. Bromley Smith
  • White House Press Officer, George Christian
  • White House Press Officer, Tom Johnson
  • Nathaniel Davis
  • Harold H. Saunders

[Here follows discussion of the Pueblo incident.]

II. The President, in introducing a discussion of the Cyprus problem, welcomed Mr. Vance to the Council table and said he wanted to thank him publicly for his efforts last November and December in avoiding a war between Greece and Turkey. He then asked Mr. Battle to summarize the problem for the Council.

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Mr. Battle said that, while Mr. Vance’s mission had saved us from war, the Cyprus problem remains. New small incidents occur weekly which heighten tension on the island. Next time it will be impossible to hold Turkey back, especially while the Greek internal situation is what it is. Ambassador Yost had reviewed the situation after Mr. Vance’s return. He concluded—and the IRG and SIG have concurred—that the situation is unstable and that it is important that we be ready to move in if required. Via the Vance mission, we have involved ourselves again in the Cypriot problem. The UN is now discussing how to tackle the long range problem and we must let the UN effort run its course, but we are not optimistic about what U Thant can achieve and should not let him fail without having something of our own ready to put in his place. Mr. Battle concluded by saying that he did not want to step into this problem, but he felt we had no choice but to be ready.

Mr. Helms noted that the Greeks have withdrawn their troops as agreed with Mr. Vance, although there are still some 1500 on the island as a regular part of the National Guard. He noted that the Greeks claim that 300 Turk officers remain in a similar capacity. There is still no inter-communal cooperation. Makarios’ declaration of a Presidential election at the end of February might further inflame the situation.2 In sum, the situation is still extremely uneasy.

In response to the President’s request, Mr. Vance summarized his feelings as follows: “The situation is still held together with paste and glue, and more paste than glue.” If it flares up again, war cannot be avoided. The majority of Turks had wanted to go to war in November. The Greek people felt humiliated and many of them are anxious for a chance to have a go at the Turks. The Cypriots are fatalistic.

He believed that the US should take an active role in trying to achieve a settlement. The pace of the problem is quicker than the pace of the UN Secretary General. He hopes the problem can be solved within the framework of the UN, but he is “not sanguine.”

Mr. Sisco agreed that the UN would not be able to do the job. He noted one slight opening in the last 24 hours—that Makarios has apparently agreed to discuss his own draft Constitution with the Turkish Cypriots. He shared the prediction that U Thant would be at the end of his road in a few days. The President asked whether there is more that Ambassador Goldberg could do. Mr. Sisco said the Ambassador had made clear his support of the Secretary General and had urged Cypriots and Turks to get together. He pointed out, however, that the Turks distrust U Thant. The Cypriot Foreign Minister wants to tie the pacification efforts envisioned in the Vance agreement to replace the withdrawn [Page 741] Greek troops with Cyprus’ protection against Turkish invasion. The Turks want to concentrate on pacification alone.

Mr. Sisco pointed out that the governments contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping force are restive and may be reluctant to renew their contributions when the current mandate for the force expires at the end of March unless there is some progress in further implementing the Vance agreement and moving toward a more permanent arrangement.

Secretary Rusk noted that it is time for serious talks with the Turks and Cypriots. He hoped we could move some diplomatic chips in before the next crisis—before we “get to the end of the road.”

Under Secretary Katzenbach agreed that the time fuse is shorter than the UN process. He noted that we are concerting with the Secretary General in order to avoid being blamed for his failure.

In response to the President’s request to summarize, Mr. Battle said that we would be in touch with the Secretary General and the parties concerned over the next few days. However, we would like to get our mediator appointed and briefed quietly in order to have him ready to step in the moment he was needed.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]

Harold H. Saunders
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 4. Secret. Drafted by Saunders. At the beginning of the meeting, President Johnson noted that it had originally been called to deal with the Cyprus question but that the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo necessitated a briefing on that matter as the initial order of business.
  2. Makarios made the announcement of elections in a January 12 national radio broadcast.