Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

341. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, December 4, 1967, 1414Z.

888. Subject: GOC reply to SYG appeal. Reference: Nicosia 883.²

1. Issuance SYG appeal without prior GOC approval forced Makarios’ hand tactically. Archbishop was required to respond in apparently positive manner since he could not very well reject UN initiative for peace once such initiative was taken. However, tone of GOC letter to SYG is guardedly affirmative at best and clearly reserves GOC positions on fundamental problems that plagued Vance discussions.³

2. Letter highlights GOC positions which will be basis for SC battle that is shaping up, viz:

A. GOC goal is “ultimate and complete withdrawal from Republic of Cyprus of all non-Cypriot armed forces” (other than UNFICYP). This includes both Greek and Turk contingents and doubtless GOC will seek tie disarming and disbanding of National Guard to withdrawal of contingents.

B. GOC will demand “effective guarantees against military intervention in affairs of Cyprus” probably from SC. Makarios will not miss opportunity to seize upon SC discussions of Cyprus problem to bring into question Turkish treaty right of intervention in Cyprus.

C. Expanded role for UNFICYP must be considered in terms of GOC “sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.” This raises question of who is going to be policeman on Cyprus: GOC with sovereignty over whole island or expanded UNFICYP to which some of GOC sovereignty would be given in trust at least temporarily.

D. Pacification and permanent peaceful solution are to be “within framework of Charter and relevant resolutions on Cyprus by SC and GA” (an obvious reference to GA resolution of December 1965 inter alia).⁴

3. In above points we can see emerging general lines of GOC strategy. Building case on sovereignty of government, UN Charter and favorable UN statements on Cyprus (March ’64 SC Resolution, December ’65 GA Resolution, Galo-Plaza Report), Makarios through his forensic Foreign Minister, Kyprianou, will attempt to achieve complete demilitarization of Cyprus, effective guarantee for inviolability of the Republic, and extension of sovereignty of his government to all parts of island including Turkish enclaves where his writ does not now run.

4. Intensity of Turk and Turk Cypriot reaction to such GOC strategy in SC can easily be imagined. Basing legal position on London/Zurich Turks will wage bitter fight for what they regard as basic elements permitting peaceful existence of Turk Cypriots on Cyprus. We have already had full plate of suspicions from Kuchukery, even before they had read letter of “acceptance.” Our next meeting, after they have digested in full the GOC reply, should be even more revealing of Turk and Turk Cypriot fears.⁵

Belcher

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to USUN, Ankara, and Athens and repeated to London, Ottawa, and the Mission to NATO.
2. Telegram 883, December 4, transmitted the text of the Cypriot reply to the Secretary-General’s appeal. (Ibid.)
3. On December 3, the Cypriot Government made an interim reply to the Secretary-General’s appeal. (U.N. Doc. S/8248/Add.7)
4. General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX).
5. The Cypriot Government, in a December 4 note, accepted the Secretary-General’s appeal and offer of good offices. The note specifically accepted the proposal for demilitarization and withdrawal of unauthorized military forces. (U.N. Doc. S/8248/Add.8)