Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

339. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, December 2, 1967, 0222Z.

848. Vanto 72. Ref: Vanto 71 (Nicosia 847).² Subj: Vance meeting with Archbishop Makarios—December 1–2.

1. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Belcher and John Walsh, had 4-hour meeting 0215, December 2, with Archbishop Makarios, Parliamentary President Clerides, and FonMin Kyprianou. Although maintaining his customary stubbornness in face of pressure from any quarter, Makarios was less dominating figure than in previous meetings. Kyprianou and Clerides tended to dominate the discussions on the Cypriot side. As in Ankara, the Cabinet was in session in an adjoining room and was reported by Kyprianou to be in negative mood. Ministerial opinion showed signs of stiffening against Turkish pressures, probably reflecting irritation at Turkish overflights of Nicosia and a growing belief that the US would hold the Turks in check.

2. Vance opened the discussion by endeavoring to impress the Archbishop with the sincerity of the US peace effort, the seriousness of the Turkish threat, and the necessity for Cyprus to pay for the events of November 14–15. This set the stage for the presentation to Makarios of the revised draft of para 4 and a draft letter of confirmation. Text follows:

“Dear Mr. Vance: You have informed me that the Governments of Greece and Turkey would be prepared to revise the language of paragraph 4 of the document, annexed to my previous letter to you, dated November 30, 1967, as follows:

‘In response to the appeal of the Secretary General, UNFICYP, under its existing mandate, would be available to undertake an enhanced and broader pacification role, which would include supervision of disarmament of all forces constituted, after 1963 and new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security including the safety of all citizens. The Secretary General’s good offices would be available to work out the specifics with the interested parties.’

If this language were approved by the Governments of Greece and Turkey, and the Secretary General were to address an appeal along the following general lines:

‘On November 24 I emphasized the need for the UN through its appropriate organs to do all it can to reverse the trend toward war resulting from the Cyprus question. The Security Council met and on November 25 called upon all the parties concerned to show the utmost moderation and restraint and to refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation in Cyprus and constitute a threat to the peace. The Security Council further requested all concerned urgently to assist and cooperate in keeping the peace and arriving at a permanent settlement in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of 4 March 1964.³

‘In the light of the Security Council consensus and the continuing tension in the area, as Secretary General of the United Nations, I now urge the Governments of Greece and Turkey to take immediate steps to remove any threat to the security of each other and of Cyprus, and as a first step along the lines of my previous appeal to bring about an expeditious withdrawal of those forces in excess of the Turkish and Greek contingents. In addition UNFICYP under its existing mandate would be available to undertake an enhanced and broader pacification role, which would include supervision of disarmament of all forces constituted after 1963 and new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security including the safety of all citizens. The Secretary General’s good offices would be available to work out the specifics with the interested parties.’

The Government of Cyprus would accept such appeal.”

3. Vance said the revised para 4 had been approved by the GOT, GOG, and SYG. Furthermore, it satisfactorily met the GOC belief that it would be unnecessary to request a new and broader mandate for UNFICYP and also would clarify for the GOC the extent of an enhanced and broader role for UNFICYP since it called for discussions with the SYG of the specifics of the new effort.

4. Makarios replied in his customary loving style. He was grateful for US assistance but could not accept ultimatum. If a “yes or no” answer was required, the answer was “no”. The revised draft was somewhat worse than the earlier draft with which he had had serious difficulties. If asked what the GOC response was to para 4, it was clear “unacceptable.” Furthermore, he could not understand why the SYG did not issue an appeal limited to the first three paragraphs.

5. After this opening salvo, it was clear that the mission’s expectations of a long and difficult evening had been fully justified. Having made his mark, the Archbishop was relatively quiet thereafter.

6. Kyprianou was center stage through most of the remaining period, worrying the draft and the problem like a terrier gnawing a bone. Occasionally, Clerides joined the game.

7. Fundamentally, Vance tried to explain to them that his mission was to prevent a war, not to solve the overall problems of Cyprus. It was understandable that the Cyprus Government resented discussions conducted under the pressure of a gun. But the revised agreement, if approved, could put an end to the guns, and could set the stage for subsequent discussions of the basic issues of the island.

8. Finally, Kyprianou drafted a bare-boned para 4 which he asked us to try out with the Greek and Turk Perm Reps in New York (see reftel).

9. It was agreed the group would reconvene at 08:30 for further discussions. Clearly it was going to be very difficult to obtain agreement of Makarios to a para 4 which makes sense.⁴

Belcher

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, USUN, London, the Mission to NATO, and USCINCEUR.
2. Vanto 71, December 1, forwarded a Cypriot proposed redraft of paragraph 4 of the agreement. (Ibid.)
3. For text of the November 25 Security Council statement (U.N. Doc. S/8266), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 368–369.
4. In Vanto 76, December 2, Vance reported that if Makarios remained adamant, he intended to tell him he would be returning immediately to Athens for passage to the United States, effectively ending the mediation effort. (Ibid.) In a December 2 memorandum to the President, 10:45 a.m., Bromley Smith explained that while Vance remained in Athens to prevent an outbreak of war, U Thant would issue a short appeal that would serve as the basis for an immediate token withdrawal of Greek forces from Cyprus. The United States hoped this approach could avoid recourse to force. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt Rostow, Box 26, Vol. 53)