333. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1
817. Vanto 50. Reference: Vanto 46 (Nicosia 812).2 Subject: Vance’s meeting with Archbishop Makarios and FonMin Kyprianou—November 29. Vance, accompanied by Amb. Belcher and John Walsh, met at 0930 with Archbishop Makarios and FonMin Kyprianou for 75 minutes. Vance again reviewed the events of the past week, stating that his mission is to prevent a war and not to solve all the complex issues of Cyprus. War has been very close this week. Had he not reached Ankara on November 23, the Turks would have gone to war. In the course of intensive discussions with the GOT, President Sunay had assured him that Turkey would not invade Cyprus. However, time ran out last night and, if Greece had not accepted the proposals, the Turkish units would have been on shores of Cyprus this morning. Intelligence estimates indicate they could put close to 50,000 men ashore with heavy equipment in 48-hours under cover of complete air control. Carnage would result.
In response, Makarios expressed his deep gratitude for the U.S. effort to preserve the peace. He fully understood the critical nature of recent days and was happy that war had not occurred. He had slept while Vance worked in Ankara, confident that nothing would happen.
[Page 683]Makarios said he understood the Greek Government had accepted the agreement document but he had not heard directly from Athens as yet. While GOG could properly make its own decisions, he had, of course, difficulties with the document, particularly para. 4.
Cyprus, he said, is plagued by the presence of foreign troops. His basic objective is the total demilitarization of the island, including the Greek and Turk contingents. Under those circumstances he would also disband the National Guard which was costing too much money. With help of UNFICYP, he would try to disarm everyone. Only police force would remain and his government would have talks with Turkish community about this.
In view of need for total demilitarization it would be difficult for him to agree that Greek and Turk contingents could remain on the island. They were source of infection and should be rooted out now.
Vance said he realized the Archbishop’s view this subject and had insisted that language relating to the withdrawal of Greek and Turk forces be qualified “as a first step along the lines of the SYG’s previous appeal.” Since the SYG’s appeal called for ultimate demilitarization, acceptance of the document in no way impeded movement toward final goal of elimination of all military forces. Therefore, removal of contingents was in no way precluded by language of document. However, GOT will not agree discuss this issue at this time. Approval of document as it stands is vital step in avoidance bloody war.
Makarios then shifted to dangers of foreign intervention, saying he hoped guarantee could be obtained from U.S. and UK on behalf of Security Council. Vance responded, saying he had no authority to give USG security commitments. He suggested Makarios look to Security Council in this respect.
Turning to para. 4, Makarios said UNFICYP already had adequate mandate and call for enlarged and improved mandate unnecessary. Vance agreed and emphasized that GOT had insisted on this language over his strong objections. Makarios then said that the para could not be accepted unless a reference were made to elimination two contingents. Vance responded that GOT would not agree and that war would be certain outcome of GOC unwillingness accept agreement. Progress on broader issues possible if war is avoided.
Vance then gave Makarios message from President Johnson. Although Archbishop read carefully and made wry comment about reference to his wisdom, he did not respond substantively.
Vance then suggested Makarios could write letter to him, stating GOC approved proposal but reserved views re removal of contingents and ultimate demilitarization. Makarios said he would draft a letter clearly indicating his views these matters. Vance pointed out that message [Page 684] would have to be restrained in tone or it would be read as rejection by GOT. This might trigger invasion with dire consequences.
Session ended with Makarios statement that he would take proposals to Cabinet and would meet with Vance later in day.
We now have 2000 local appointment with Makarios.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 1759Z and also sent to Ankara, Athens, USUN, London, the Mission to NATO, and USCINCEUR.↩
- Vanto 46, November 29, reported on Vance’s 8:30 a.m. meeting with Kyprianou, during which Kyprianou outlined his government’s objections to the proposed accord. (Ibid.)↩