Office of the Historian

331. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus1

Washington, November 29, 1967, 0113Z.

76019. Tovan 37. Ref.: Vanto 41.2 For Vance from Secretary.

1.
Problem all along with Makarios has been that US does not have much of a handle on him. We have no economic or military aid program, and communications facilities, for which we are to pay rent, are distinctly to our advantage.
2.
Makarios has never wavered in his conviction that US will not permit Turkey to invade Cyprus. Your present mission is probably seen by him as further convincing evidence of this. In current crisis Russians have complicated matters by telling GOC that Turks are bluffing. You would wish to disabuse him on this—in fact, if you can scare him it might be helpful.
3.
In circumstances best tactic would appear be to attempt play on Makarios’ vanity by stressing his positive role as champion of peace. If this fails, you should try convince Makarios that if he tries torpedo Greek-Turkey accord, and Turks invade as result, GOC would be considered as bearing the principal responsibility for failure to avert a catastrophe. In such circumstances world opinion would be turned against GOC, and would regard GOC as having set political objective above peace. In such circumstances, moreover, GOC should not be assuming that US would intervene militarily. GOC will have noted that there has been no change in routine disposition of Sixth Fleet throughout this crisis.
4.
Above is best strategy I can think of view lack of the instrumentalities of support we possess in other countries. In general you could stress that lack of cooperative action will inevitably have effect on our future relations, without being specific. I would caution you against suggesting any specific US action to help Makarios if he behaves, beyond renewed willingness to be helpful in attempt solve general Cyprus problem, in view well-known tendency of Makarios to use such gestures to his own advantage.
5.
In the event you get indications that Makarios feels that he can disregard the Greek-Turk agreement by going to the Security Council on the assumption he could get a better deal, you should tell him bluntly that we would use every possible means at our disposal to prevent this [Page 680] and to ensure that any action there would not go beyond the substance of the Greek-Turk agreement.
6.
We would prefer that you use the above only if Makarios refers to this possibility; otherwise, we see no particular advantage in your taking the initiative in this regard.
7.
The following points may be useful to you, subject to Ambassador Belcher’s views. (He is real expert on Makarios.)
(a)
I understand that Makarios reacts badly to strong words and a forceful approach.
(b)
It should be made very clear to him that GOG has made a difficult decision and requires his support.
(c)
Makarios does value his relations with the US, and could be encouraged anticipate more active effort on our part to tackle general Cyprus problem once this crisis over.
8.
Congratulations on a superb job so far, and good luck!
9.
By separate telegram we are sending revised text Presidential message to Makarios3 which we have toned down somewhat in belief this likely be more effective and to make letter less susceptible of being used against us should Makarios decide complain in Security Council that he being pressed by US to give in to Turkish demands.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Rockwell; cleared by Sisco, Katzenbach, and Battle; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Athens and Ankara.↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 330.↩
  3. Transmitted in telegram 76018 to Nicosia, November 29. It called on Makarios to make the concessions needed to ensure a peaceful settlement of the confrontation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)↩