317. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

2338. NATUS. Ref: State 74022.2

1.
I called on King at 1200 local just before meeting convened at Palace of “little Cabinet” (PriMin, FinMin, 5 military Ministers) and outlined points in paras 2 and 3 reftel. King grimaced at idea of recalling Greek military personnel under heat of Turkish military pressure. I suggested Makarios initiative, if it forthcoming as we now urgently recommending,[Page 659]ought give good basis for Greek token withdrawal as earnest of good will. Discussion revealed Royal firmness on point that any Greek action would have to be matched by comparable Turkish de-escalation action. I came away with impression that if Vance can get Turkish pledge of some visible pullback we can expect to be able to persuade Greeks to order withdrawal of some troops. However, in matters such as these King both influences Ministers and is influenced by them. I may be able to get better reading of Greek mood today after Cabinet meeting.
2.
I have impression mood developing in Palace and “little Cabinet” to go for complete demilitarization of Cyprus as part of settlement this crisis if war avoided. In [King?] says military Ministers now tending to want to get rid of Greek and Turkish contingents as well as all forces put on island since 1963. In their developing view, internal security could then be maintained either by reinforced UNFICYP or by merging Cypriot National Guard and Turkish-Cypriot military and paramilitary units into single national Cyprus force.
3.
I mentioned USG concern over protection of minorities in Greece and Turkey as tensions heightened. King immediately suggested Greece would welcome American or other international observers during period of crisis in areas where Turkish ethnics congregated, on assumption Turkey would offer similar facilities.
4.
I also noted importance of obtaining from GOG assurance that Greeks will not initiate military action during period of discussions, and said I had already communicated his pledge that there would be no preemptive strike by Greek forces. “Never”, he replied.
Talbot
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Received at 1331Z and repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, Ottawa, USUN, the Mission to NATO, CINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
  2. Telegram 74022 to Athens, November 23, instructed Talbot to suggest to the King that Greece immediately offer to withdraw 500 troops from Cyprus and indicate its readiness to discuss further withdrawals. (Ibid.)