Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State ¹

Nicosia, November 23, 1967, 1020Z.

723. Reference: State 74021.² Subject: Possible Makarios-King Constantine message.

1. Makarios saw me 9:30 AM (local). As expected, however, he reiterated his position as set forth Nicosia 710³ that he could not get out in front by sending unilateral message. I then urged him consider proposing to GOG that joint message be sent. This would avoid either King or Makarios being singled out as one who “sold out Hellenism”. Makarios’ initial reaction was that this idea had merit. He wondered if message might be sent by himself and King jointly to UNSYG who then could take further action on it. I said that such a proposal could well fit in with presence of Rolz-Bennett in Ankara later today. If offer inherent in proposed text could be made to U Thant as response SYG’s appeal and then forwarded by him to Rolz-Bennett in Ankara, latter might be able make excellent use of it in his conversations with Turks. This might well be instrument for defusing situation and getting Turk finger off the button.

2. Makarios asked if I thought presence of high-level emissaries in Ankara might result in defusing situation. I had feared Vance and Rolz-Bennett Missions might be seized upon by him as excuse for further procrastination. I am sure this is what was in his mind. I told him in very strong terms that we convinced all they could do was buy some time by their presence and that Turks would require some sort of response from Greeks. I said we convinced that reduction of armed confrontation on island was central to their basic position as set forth in five points.⁴ If no move made at least in this direction, I could see no hope in situation. Since he accepted in principle concept set forth in proposed message and King accepted in principle and since concept of demilitarization encompassed points two and three of Turk five points, surely sensible thing to do at this stage was to move along these lines. He said he would have to consult his advisers and I asked him notify me perhaps through Clerides as soon as possible since time was of the essence. Also offered transmit any message for him if this would facilitate matter.

3. I immediately called on Clerides and Alexandrakis and made similar presentation and believe have won their support. Also tried impress on both of them need for swift action in order take advantage Rolz-Bennett presence Ankara. Alexandrakis had one important modification to suggest in proposal. He believes that message if agreed to by Makarios and his government should be from Kollias and Makarios rather than from King. He fears that public reaction in Greece to message would be very adverse and he did not want to risk institution of monarchy in this connection. As he put it, we can sacrifice Kollias in the interests of peace but not the King.

4. Ambassador Talbot may wish proceed put these same ideas to GOG without awaiting for Makarios’ final reaction. Could be that Greeks might wish take initiative in developing joint message. Believe they may be more aware of need for speed than is Archbishop who is characteristically a procrastinator.

Belcher

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash. Received at 1206Z. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Ankara, London, Ottawa, the Mission to NATO, and USUN.
2. Telegram 74021 to Nicosia, November 23, instructed Belcher to make the strongest presentation possible to Makarios to ensure a peaceful settlement of the crisis. (Ibid.)
3. Document 13.
4. See footnote 3, Document 314.