Office of the Historian

312. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, November 22, 1967, 0205Z.

2296. Ref: 2294, 2295.2

1.
At 0230 local King summoned me to Greek Pentagon where he meeting with senior Cabinet members and Chiefs of Staff. He asked that I urgently inform USG that GOG had reached several conclusions tonight:
A.
PriMin and FonMin now completing draft reply to Turkish note of Nov 17. Reply which hopefully will hold door open for Greek-Turk talks expected to be ready for delivery in morning.
B.
GOG will welcome Brosio’s injecting himself more actively in relieving Greek-Turkish differences and is so informing him.3
C.
Idea of joint GOG-GOC approach to UNSYG was considered but discarded for tonight because of doubt UN would act fast enough or that Turkey would agree to participate in talks at this stage with GOC as well as GOG.
D.
GOG would welcome invitation from President Johnson to King Constantine and President Sunay, with their Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, to meet together in United States to discuss peace between Greece and Turkey.
2.
In course of evening King had grown enthusiastic about this last idea. I suggested that since I could not know how President would feel about this suggestion or whether it would be realistic in relation to all other considerations he must have in mind perhaps we could start by exploring idea hypothetically. For example, could Greece accept not just simple invitation but something suggesting specific direction of talks? Earlier in evening, King had mentioned demilitarization of Cyprus. Turks talking about removal of Greek forces before bilateral talks. Would it be feasible for President, if he should extend invitation, to indicate he understood Greece and presumably Turkey looking toward demilitarization of Cyprus and was inviting their highest representatives to talks on how to achieve this and other steps necessary to resolve current difficulties and restore friendly Greek-Turkish relations?
3.
King felt this might give GOG difficulties but excused himself for few moments to consult PriMin and FonMin. On his return he said government shared his feeling it would not be appropriate to have agreement to demilitarization as a condition of meeting, which should be called to discuss urgent issue of peace between Greece and Turkey. However, acceptance of demilitarization would certainly be important question for discussion, along with adjustment of treaty provisions relating to unilateral intervention and other questions. He said again that most of his Ministers and Chiefs of Staff want to get Greek forces out of Cyprus.
4.
I promised to convey his ideas to Washington immediately. He hoped that response could be prompt.
5.
In absence of Canadian and British colleagues I made no reference to Turkish ideas of basis for settlement that we expect to put to Foreign Minister in morning. Perhaps phrasing can be found which will meet Turkish minimum needs for indication for action before talks but also get top level talks going rapidly.
6.
On another subject, King mentioned that Makarios has proposed plans which GOG studying tonight for partial mobilization and full mobilization in Cyprus.
Talbot
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Received at 0327Z and repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, the Mission to NATO, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.↩
  2. Telegram 2294 from Athens, November 21, reported that the King had suggested that President Johnson invite himself and President Sunay to Washington for talks designed to head off a clash over Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 2295 from Athens, November 21, reported that King Constantine assured Talbot that Greece would not launch a preemptive strike against Turkish invasion forces but warned that the time for effective diplomatic intervention was short. (Ibid.)↩
  3. On November 24, NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio announced that he would go to the crisis area in an effort to find a solution.↩