Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

309. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, November 17, 1967, 1452Z.

2186. NATUS.

1. I took occasion of delivery of Secretary’s message to Prime Minister (State 70871)² to weigh in heavily with him (and later with King) on potential further serious explosion unless Grivas is removed from Cyprus scene immediately, even though temporarily.

2. PriMin thanked me for Secretary’s message and said that GOG is determined to show greatest wisdom and restraint in order to preserve peace between two countries. He reverted to his suspicions of Turkish intentions, referring to following: Turk overflights, Turk armored brig being moved towards Everos triangle and demonstrations in Istanbul when anti-Greek and anti-American slogans heard. GOG had strictly forbidden any intervention of RHAF in connection overflights and movement of Greek troops toward Evros from Alexandropoulis had been halted. I congratulated him on this restraint and said that as one who is deeply concerned about situation I must say that today looks worse than yesterday did, particularly with the renewal of patrolling in Agios Theodoros. He did not appear aware of this development. I passed on our reports from Nicosia (Nicosia 638 and previous).³

3. I said I was afraid that this resumption would not be taken by Ankara as indication of restraint and peaceful inclinations on part Cypriot Govt.

4. I then turned to Grivas problem and said that I did not like to refer to individuals when discussing policy matters yet as one who had lived through Cyprus difficulties in 1964, I felt that Turks would no doubt take the traditional attitudes and look upon Grivas actions as having been ordered by GOG since both Grivas and other Greek officers serving in Cyprus are all active officers of Greek forces. PriMin insisted this was not correct because as soon as GOG had learned of Grivas actions it had at once made strong recommendation and on next day requested GOC to refrain from any further action re Agios Theodoros. Grivas and other regular Greek officers in Cyprus take their orders from GOC not Athens govt. I said I was not speaking under instructions but had been mulling over ways which might help reduce tension. It had occurred to me that one way might be to invite Grivas to Athens for consultations. Such gesture could be taken in Ankara as sign of good faith of GOG and its desire to reduce tension on island. I continued that there are hawks and doves in Ankara and we do not know what decisions and discussions are being held there nor what has been said during last 24 hours that GNA has been meeting behind closed doors. PriMin promptly replied that GOG had already thought of this. He regrets that his thoughts coincided with those of the American Ambassador. Now if this action is taken it will be presumed that it is result of American pressure. I replied I would be more than glad to withdraw suggestion at once.

5. I assured PriMin I was aware that many people feel that American recommendations for restraint are made only in Athens. All one could say to them is that they do not know what has been happening in Ankara during the last week. PriMin said he understood that and certainly recommendations for moderation from US to two allies who are in difficulty cannot be interpreted as intervention. He reverted to another recount of his suspicions of intentions of Turks to create yet another pocket and cut off Nicosia-Limassol-Larnaca road. He then appealed to US to use all possible means to convince Turkish side of good intentions of GOG because he feels that good faith on part GOG only may not be enough. I assured him that USG is well aware of good intentions of GOG and we would be happy to help in any way that PriMin feels would be helpful to both parties.

6. Although our conversation laid sensitive problem on the line in frank tones, PriMin did not react in scratchy, near irascible manner he sometimes does. He appeared to be deeply worried man seeking way out of dilemma.⁴

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 1602Z and repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Brussels for the Mission to NATO, USUN, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
2. Telegram 70871 to Athens, November 17, transmitted a message from Rusk for Kollias congratulating Greece on its restraint over the Cyprus issue. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 638 from Nicosia, November 17, reported on further fighting in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 2182 from Athens, November 17, Talbot reported that King Constantine had informed him that the Greek Government had ordered Grivas’ withdrawal. (Ibid.)