Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

286. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State¹

Paris, May 9, 1967, 2018Z.

17886. NATUS. Subject: Sec McNamara’s talk with General Spandidakis. Following is memcon, still subject to clearance with SecDef:

1. Minister of Defense Spandidakis, accompanied by Ambassador Palamas and an interpreter, called on Secretary McNamara in his USRO office at 1630 immediately following conclusion of the Defense Ministers meeting. Ambassador Cleveland and Assistant Secretary McNaughton were present. Spandidakis initiated the conversation by saying he assumed McNamara wanted to know why the military acted in Greece. He then talked through the interpreter for 15 minutes.

2. He said that from 1964 things had been deteriorating in Greece, that the political parties had been corrupted, that there were a number of liaisons with the Communists, and that there was a Communist build-up everywhere including the army. It was clear the country was going to fall in Communist hands, so the army, to prevent this, took over on April 21 despite the Constitution. Spandidakis referred at this point to the need to prevent a return to guerrilla warfare (“another Vietnam”) in Greece. He said the ease with which the revolution was carried off in a few hours proves it was accepted by the Greek people. He said there were no “victims” (he would not count as victims the two people who were killed in violating the curfew). He pointed out that peace reigned in Greece two days after the action. He said the population, except for a Communist small (12–15 percent) minority, accepts the action.

3. Spandidakis said the attacks on the Greek action are mainly from foreign countries, by Communist governments or by groups associated with the Communists. He referred also to false rumors such as the alleged kidnapping of the King’s daughter to put pressure on the King, and the rumors about the regime’s intentions to execute Andreas Papandreou and Communist leader Glazes. But he said the “greatest bitterness is in the rumor that the US would revise its assistance to Greece.” He said this made no sense because the alternative was to surrender to Communism. He said that, as it is, the ties between Greece and NATO are stronger now than before.

4. He said it is true that some people have been detained, including George Papandreou—who, he says, is now being treated better than he would be in his own house. He referred to others being kept in hotels, in comfortable circumstances as the press could see for itself. He said such detentions were necessary to stop their stirring up trouble.

5. Spandidakis said the government had a four-point program: (1) to reorganize the government mechanism, (2) to establish economic control, (3) to revise the Constitution to “bring it up to date”, and (4) to “return the country to a constitutional order.” He said no one knows how long the program would take, that it depends on the depth of the preexisting disorganization. He said, “All of us are of a democratic point of view; we are not going to establish a Fascist regime in Greece”. He added that today there is no Parliament but, except for that, there is more democracy today than before April 21; he said they had anarchy at that time. He pointed to the interest taken by the new government in the farmers and low income groups, who have expressed their appreciation.

6. Secretary McNamara said he was grateful for the explanation and for Spandidakis’ frankness (which frankness, together with sincerity, Spandidakis had emphasized on three occasions). McNamara said he would likewise be frank. He said it was unnecessary to tell a Greek of the admiration that the American people have for the Greek people: we have had a very close relationship with them over the past two decades; and our civilization is based upon theirs, dating back 2500 years. He said it is completely natural for our young people to expect to travel in Greece; indeed, his daughter had spent the last year there and is still there. He said it concerns us greatly that Greece has moved away from constitutional processes.

7. McNamara said it would be unbecoming of him to comment on Greek internal affairs, but that it was not inappropriate for him to comment on US internal affairs. He then said that the American people could never understand a statement that there is more democracy today than before April 21—with the press suppressed, assembly prevented, people restrained, no free speech, and other constitutional guarantees suspended. Also, important to the view by the American people was the absence of any schedule for resumption of constitutional processes. These, he said, are strong feelings of most of the people in the US, and he and other government officials are servants of the people. He said it would be extraordinarily difficult to maintain the Greek military assist-ance program without modification if there is no acceptable time schedule for the resumption of constitutional processes.

8. McNamara said that he believed Spandidakis’ statement that he opposed a Fascist government, but that the American view would be greatly affected by the degree to which the Greeks indicate (a) a desire to make the change, (b) a schedule for the change, and (c) actions toward the change. McNamara said the US would be willing to try to help—e.g., by avoiding any public denunciation. But he said, the Greeks should not underestimate the concern of the US and the strong hopes for movement back toward constitutional processes.

9. Spandidakis at this point said, “Then you must explain the facts to the American people”. McNamara responded that, unfortunately, the facts seemed to be as stated earlier—people detained, constitutional processes suspended, etc. He said that the US looks to the future with hope along the lines he had described.

10. Spandidakis said that a revision of the Military Assistance Program would be dangerous, spelling out the Greek reliance on US aid. McNamara said that the whole Greek situation is dangerous, and that, until action is taken to remedy it, the dangerous situation will continue. He hoped the Greeks could see a path for return to constitutional government which would make progress in that direction obvious to outsiders. He added his view that the greatest deterrent to the Soviets and the thing most likely to encourage support from the US would be a demonstration by the Greeks that they can return to constitutional processes.

11. Spandidakis said that continuation of MAP will shorten the time required. McNamara answered that, as Greek plans along the lines he had described became firmer, we can be informed of the progress, and public support for MAP in our country will grow.

12. Spandidakis asked what if the election had taken place and Greece had gone Communist. McNamara said he would not speculate but did not believe Greece would vote the Communists into power. After Spandidakis explained that only 12–15 percent of the population are Communist, but that more than 50 percent of the people were going to make the mistake of following them, Palamas said that the political parties had been behaving in such a way as to let the Communists take over. McNamara repeated that the important thing was to lay out a course of action to return to the constitutional processes.

13. The conversation was concluded at 1720 with a short exchange on reliability of NATO as an ally of Greece in trouble—both Spandidakis and Palamas suggesting that NATO was in such disarray that it could not be counted on to come to Greece’s aid. McNamara said that, in his view, NATO is in much better condition today than it was a year ago, pointing to a year of “tremendous accomplishment” in both the political and military sense, pointing to the way the Allies had successfully survived the French withdrawal and eviction, and to the birth and apparent good start of the NPG. He added that we need (and will, in his view, be doing) more NATO planning in support of defensive actions on the flanks.

Cleveland

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Athens, USCINCEUR, and EUCOM for POLAD.