281. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
4942. 1. During 75-minute conversation at Tatoi this evening King Constantine appeared under considerably less strain than I had seen him at any time since coup. He thought meetings with Cabinet members yesterday had gone well. My net impression is that he is moving rapidly to adjust his relations with coup government and has moderate expectations of gradually regaining leadership of army and government.
2. According to his account, meeting with Cabinet group Monday evening went very satisfactorily. After berating coup instigators once again for having moved without his knowledge, he had told them: “Now you have done it and you are here. Now you must not fail.” Patakos had replied that coup had already succeeded. King’s response was that “not at all. You have succeeded in taking country, but unless you succeed in running it you have brought Greece to final disaster.” He had then lectured them on need to get expert advice on economic and other problems and act constructively and effectively. Cabinet members had repeatedly insisted on their loyalty to King. In response to his repeated questions, they had also insisted that army is loyal him.
3. King said he had pressed Cabinet hard on need to demonstrate to Greece’s allies that its goal is resumption of constitutional government. Drawing on points discussed earlier between him and me,2 he had told them that government must promptly set up some sort of constitution-drafting committee to prepare revised constitution that would be examined by government and then subjected to national plebiscite, after which elections could be held under new constitution. To his great satisfaction, they had agreed to announce this program. He had therefore consented to attend Cabinet meeting Wednesday at which he believed major item of business would be promulgation of new constitution-making process.
4. I commented that main problem might be to obtain domestic and foreign credibility. It would be easy to announce such a scheme, but who would believe it? Perhaps Royal decree could be issued, committing both King and government to fixed process. King said he would pursue this line Wednesday.
[Page 592]5. I told King our main problem at moment is what sort of relations to have with coup government. While question of recognition does not arise, we remain exceedingly uncomfortable at having Greek ally under military dictatorship. Embassy is showing this discomfort in cool and reserved posture. Obviously, Americans would find it extremely difficult during this period to deliver tanks and similar major weaponry to regime which has used American-made tanks to overthrow established government. He would understand that this would have to be our posture until Greek Government itself sorts out its purposes and programs. Perhaps our rather stiff posture might even help him re-establish his Kingly position with this regime.
6. King agreed, adding that he hoped we would not get such an inflexible position that we could not respond if this government should demonstrate its readiness to return to constitutional rule. I commented that given public and congressional opinion, this was a risk, but that unless this government reached that state there was no prospect that American reserve would melt. King said he understood.
7. King said he had finally faced Cabinet with protracted question of unsigned decree declaring martial law and suspending certain articles of the Constitution. He had told Cabinet that government had acted without his signature, that he saw no sense in signing decree now and did not propose to do so. There had been no visible reaction, so he thought he probably had gotten away with this issue.
8. However, they insisted (Athens 4934)3 that his secretary, Major Arnaoutis, go abroad and he had agreed. This left him without staff. I suggested that anyone in his position needed some confidant, and expressed the hope that he would find someone who could effectively replace Ambassador Bitsios (who cravenly resigned at height of crisis) and Major Arnaoutis.
9. King said Cabinet members had told him government greatly needs his support and that public increasingly anxious because of stories he not in accord with regime. They asked him to show himself at Easter eve religious ceremonies next Saturday night and to take part in traditional egg-cracking frivolities in army barracks. He said this depended on whether army is truly loyal to him. He would reserve decision for some days until he could get better reading. They professed army absolutely loyal to King even though they and army commanders had acted without his knowledge last Friday morning, “but only to protect you, Your Majesty.”
[Page 593]10. King said these are people inexperienced in government who include some really stupid types such as Farmakis, but that it now becomes his role to gain their confidence, persuade them that he is not plotting a counter-coup, get time to work on country’s serious problems, and gradually reassert his authority. I commented that this is sort of program that would require his continuing to follow delicate path of neither embracing nor breaking with coup group, and taking advantage of their need of him at early stages to extract all vital concessions. He replied that he is type who gets giddy on tightrope but he will try.
11. I noted that since first night of coup I had not been in touch with Ministers of new government but that Prime Minister Kollias had summoned me for Wednesday morning. I said I was asking instructions (Athens 4941).4 He expressed hope I could talk with Prime Minister to reinforce King’s line before Cabinet meeting.5
12. I mentioned that Sixth Fleet task group is still in Aegean Sea though it has other chores. If situation easing, did he think it might be on its way? King replied that while government’s true intentions may take two or three weeks to come out, he now is confident he and his family will stay in Greece. He would have no objection to departure of task group, though he would hope it could come back rapidly if situation should deteriorate. I said that we keep task groups always in Mediterranean, which isn’t such huge sea after all.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to Bonn for Secretary Rusk, USCINCEUR, USDOCOSouth, the Secretary of Defense, JCS, DIA, and London. Passed to the White House, DOD, USIA, CIA, and NSA.↩
- Talbot reported on discussions with the King regarding treatment of the junta in telegram 4840 from Athens, April 23. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 4934, April 25, reported on a meeting between the King and Colonel Papadopoulos and summarized the King’s comments on the meeting and recent developments in the military. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 4941, April 25, requested permission to respond favorably to Prime Minister Kollias’ request for a meeting. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 182277 to Athens, April 25, the Department of State replied: “We have no objection to your seeing Kollias. Suggest you take this opportunity to ask regarding welfare of political prisoners and newspaper owners.” (Ibid.)↩