279. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 1

4856. 1. Sixty hours after coup Embassy estimates that new authoritarian government is solidly in control. Key is unity of army. New command appointments and military moods discerned by attaches and JUSMAGG strengthen belief that no significant opposition exists to present control of armed forces.

[Page 588]

2. Chances of countercoup, never bright, have sunk hour by hour and now seem virtually nil. King, whose surprise at and opposition to coup is becoming increasingly widely recognized here, presumably is also recognizing coup as fait accompli.

3. Coup is revolutionary. Its central core—Papadopoulos, described as the top theoretician; Patakos, the top executive; and Makerezos—are limited, politically inexperienced, tough-minded, no-nonsense types setting out to “purify” Greek political, social and economic life. Their manifesto sounds like Ayub in 1958. Also like 1958 model Ayub, they declare themselves thousand percent pro-American and are urgently seeking any hint of American understanding of what they’re doing. With or without it, they know they must succeed or lose their heads.

4. If military coup in this NATO country has demolished liberal political reputation of Greece, oddly enough failure of coup—once attempted—would have been even greater disaster. Coup effort pushed aside political moderates and conservatives (as represented by Kanellopoulos government and its supporters) who were duped not by their enemies but by group with roughly similar anxieties about strong leftist trends in Greece. Had coup failed, carrying conservatives and moderates down with it, only beneficiaries would have been far leftist segment of Greek political life. Greece would then have surely gone where rightists fear Andreas Papandreou was taking it.

5. While it is early to judge causes of coup, personality and policies of Andreas Papandreou may be prime reason Greece today is under dictatorship. King, moderate centrists and moderate conservatives had all been opposing ultra-rightist convictions that only the army could safeguard Greece from Communism. Andreas’ style and the thrust of his threats to the Greek “establishment”, particularly the armed forces, were alien to normal to-ing and fro-ing of Greek political life. Because they exceeded bounds of Greek political tolerance and therefore induced deepest distrust in rightist quarters especially the army, Andreas lost chance to move Greece in directions he favored.

6. These thoughts are historical footnotes. Question is what direction to take next. Until now Embassy has indicated readiness to stay in communication with new government and top military leadership but has coldly pointed out American reaction to overthrow of parliamentary government of a NATO ally by military establishment trained and equipped by Americans. We have been all but rude to Spandidakis and others in cross-examining their assertions that they and other properly constituted commanders are actually in control of army. Without predicting what policy lines United States might adopt we have spelled out possible consequences in short words. We have made sure arrival of Sixth Fleet task force group in Greek waters has not gone unnoticed by [Page 589] top people. If we haven’t educated the mule, at least we have given it those knocks required to get its attention.2

7. Now that we have its attention, what do we say? From our vantage point here, what is essential is to get Greece pointed again in direction of some kind of government with consent of governed. Obviously this government is not about to yield power to a political government. Therefore, question is one of transitional arrangements. One possibility is, for example, Vietnam pattern: a pledge by new government to proceed toward election of a constituent assembly which in turn would produce revised constitution subject to plebiscite. Another idea is establishment by fiat of a national constitutional council consisting of eminent jurists and others of unquestioned integrity and stature. Whatever the mechanism, avowed steps toward restoration of constitutional rule would give promise of way out from present dictatorial deadend.

8. There are fragmentary indications that new government is hunting for some such course. It badly needs cooperation and participation of responsible conservatives, at least. Latter (of whom former Foreign Minister Averoff and Bank of Greece Deputy John Pesmazoglu have already expressed their anxieties to me) could contribute to solution. Moreover, declaration of definite constitutional course by this government would enable King to identify himself with specific constructive purposes and thus bring him back into tolerable relationship with army and public life. This would also help to justify in eyes of American public opinion USG cooperation with coup government.

9. While maintaining stiffish attitude toward present government for time being, I propose unless Department objects to stimulate exploration of above ideas with key members of new government and with others who may be in a position to influence this regime. I also propose to suggest it to King as line worth considering to break current impasse.3

Talbot
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. The time of transmission on the source text is illegible; the telegram was received at 3:29 p.m. Repeated to CINCEUR, USDOCOSouth, the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and DIA. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA.
  2. In telegram 4901 from Athens, April 24, the Embassy reported “deep distress” on the part of the coup leaders to the “negative reaction” of the United States to their actions, and concern about possible employment of the Sixth Fleet against them. It also reported that the new government was “absolutely determined” to fulfill its goals. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 181282 to Athens, April 24, the Department of State informed Talbot that military aid shipments to Greece would be discontinued for the time being and that “In sum, we should follow a policy of watchful waiting, and an attitude of coolness towards new govt while encouraging King vigorously to support move towards more viable government.” (Ibid.)