276. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 1
4792. 1. By mutual request, I called 2200 local time on PriMin Kollias at his office in presence of Vice Premier and Def. Min. Gen. Spandidakis.
[Page 584]2. In introductory comment, PriMin asserted that today’s developments were prompted by grave Communist threat to Greece and by decision of army to thwart this threat. Army has established complete control throughout country without any bloodshed. PriMin emphasized that purpose of his government is to protect freedoms of all Greeks and to restore normality as soon as possible.
3. Gen Spandidakis broke in to report, as we knew, that telephone communications have been restored and other communications would return to normal tomorrow. In response to my question regarding well-being of people arrested today, Spandidakis stated former PriMin Kanellopoulos, Papaligouras, and other people in ERE govt would be released tonight immediately after our conversation or at latest Saturday morning. He said that George Papandreou, but not Andreas, would also be released, although he did not specify when. Spandidakis assured me that none of detainees would be physically harmed.
4. I told PriMin that, acting on instructions from my government2 I must state (a) that we were deeply distressed by today’s developments, including the use of American-furnished equipment to overthrow the constitutional government of Greece, and (b) that we will look to government to maintain order, open communications to stranded Americans, and restore normal life as rapidly as possible. Spandidakis reported that communications will be restored by tomorrow.
5. Gen. Eaton, who was with me, and I also expressed great concern over use of American-supplied equipment in today’s coup. PriMin responded that he was also sorry that use was made of this matériel, but that action was absolutely essential in view of Communist threat. By Communist, he explained that he meant not only those who belong to extreme left but also those who “sympathize” with them. (In latter category he undoubtedly was thinking of Andreas.) PriMin asserted that, had military not acted, another Viet-Nam might have occurred in Greece and country might have fallen in Iron Curtain abyss. Neither Spandidakis nor PriMin was precise in explaining what exactly had happened to trigger coup.
6. I responded that I hoped (a) that if army was instrument of coup it would plainly be under control of senior military leaders not of junior officers, and (b) that new government would be completely loyal to and [Page 585] responsive to orders of King. PriMin and Spandidakis both alleged that government is devoted to King and strong supporter of NATO. They expressed hope that GOG, as in past, could count on support of US.
7. Asked about calling of Parliament into session, PriMin told me that Parliament could not meet until elections were held and that latter depended on developments. In any case, he hoped that normal conditions would soon be restored and that elections could be conducted at an early time.
8. Observing both Kollias and Spandidakis tonight, I was confirmed in my impression that PriMin is merely front-man and that real power rests with military. Question is which military.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE. Secret; Flash. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense, DIA, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth. Received at 7:07 p.m. and passed to the White House, CIA, DOD, USIA, and NSA at 7:10 p.m.↩
- In telegram 180319 to Athens, April 21, the Department of State approved the approach outlined by Talbot in telegram 4787 from Athens, Document 275. The telegram contained an estimate that U.S. helicopters could evacuate the Royal family within 36 hours of a request. It further instructed Talbot to disabuse the King of any notion of a U.S. military intervention, adding that it was “alarmed” by the tenor of Constantine’s report to Talbot: “Admittedly he is not calling all the shots but riding herd on this faction of the Greek army and political spectrum would not seem to hold nearly the same dangers as he would have faced had an Aspida-type military team moved in.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 GREECE)↩
- In an April 22 memorandum to the President, Rostow noted that continued U.S. silence on events in Athens, a position that Secretary Rusk had chosen, was creating major difficulties for the “Administration’s posture before the intellectual and liberal communities in the U.S.” Rostow nonetheless argued that for the present the United States should refrain from a public statement. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Greece, Vol. 2)↩