25. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts1

1675. 1. Critic Message from Ankara,2 repeated to you by Department, told of warning Turks have given to Makarios,3 that they would move if attacks on Turkish Cypriots did not stop. Ambassador Hare asked for 24 hours consultation, and Erkin said he would so recommend.

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2. Secretary spoke with Ralph Bunche at UN Headquarters directly. Bunche reported substance of above to SYG and Canadian FonMin Paul Martin who there with SYG at the time.

3. In subsequent telecon directly with Paul Martin, Secretary gave him substance of Ambassador Hare’s reports, and asked him to start Canadian troops moving toward Cyprus, even if they had to stage through some Near Eastern base or British sovereign bases in Cyprus. (When President called Prime Minister Pearson earlier in day, Pearson had said only obstacle immediate movement ready Canadian battalion was need for SYG’s assurance some other countries (other than British) would also be participating in international force.) Martin said he would “see what we can do immediately.”

4. In absence British Ambassador, Under Secretary called in British Minister Greenhill Thursday evening, gave him substance of report from Ankara and indications of Turkish troop movements. Under Secretary said we should move along several lines simultaneously. Rapid formulation of UN force was one route being vigorously pursued. But seemed to us moment had now come for calling of summit conference under Treaty of Guarantee, Greece, Turkey, UK (and possibly Makarios and Kutchuk) previously agreed with UK to be useful fall-back at some stage of game.

5. Greenhill said as we knew London had been thinking along same lines. He asked where we thought conference should be held. Under Secretary said he remembered British suggestion was to hold it in Geneva. Under Secretary and Greenhill agreed Makarios and Kutchuk would need to be invited, and Greenhill mentioned also representative of SYG. (If held in Geneva, Spinelli would be obvious choice.)

6. Under Secretary noted Makarios in Athens for funeral. British said their understanding was Archbishop intended stay in Athens until Friday but British had offered fly him back to Nicosia via RAF whenever he wished. Greenhill, as own idea, suggested SYG might go to Nicosia to help calm things down. US reaction to this idea was inconclusive. Under Secretary said regardless of what was done, summit meeting nevertheless was not in conflict with any UN moves at this juncture.

For London: Ambassador Bruce should press British on immediate summit as political deterrent to Turkish action.4

For Nicosia and Athens: You should convey to Makarios and Papandreou and Clerides our judgment that Turks are serious, and that immediate turning off of violence is essential.5 Note that Greek Cypriots [Page 53] demonstrated during entire period of Security Council session that they had sufficient control to insure relative absence of bloodshed on Island.

For Paris USRO: Ambassador Finletter may inform Stikker of developments stressing that it is for his personal information only and not for NATO action.

For Ottawa: Press Canadians for immediate action moving troops toward Cyprus. Martin said he would let us know through Embassy Ottawa what action being taken.6

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Cleveland, cleared by Burdett, and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to the White House, JCS, and CIA.
  2. Dated March 12. Hare reported that the Turkish Government had sent an ultimatum to the Cypriot Government to impose an immediate cease-fire or face unilateral intervention by Turkey. (Ibid.)
  3. The text of the Turkish message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1161 from Ankara, March 13. (Ibid.)
  4. In telegram 4474 from London, March 13, Bruce reported that the British Government did not think a Greek-Turkish summit meeting would prove useful. (Ibid.)
  5. In telegram 1392 from Athens, March 13, Labouisse reported that Costopoulos was irritated with the Turkish action but had cautioned moderation on the Cypriot Government. (Ibid.) In telegram 956 from Nicosia, March 13, Belcher reported that Acting President Clerides stated that every effort was being made to secure a cease-fire. (Ibid.)
  6. Telegram 1196 from Ottawa, March 13, recommended inviting the Canadian Government to any peace conference on Cyprus. (Ibid.)