Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

219. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, January 24, 1966, 0545Z.

367. NATUS. Ankara’s 819 to Dept; Embtel 364.²

1. We agree with Ankara’s 819 that general framework for solution should consist of enosis with compensations to Turkey in some form. However, we have serious doubts about anyone getting Makarios to agree to serve up sufficient compensations here on the island to enable GOT to regard solution as double enosis. Unless outside parties ready to impose double enosis concept on Greek Cypriots most we might be able persuade GOC accept would be GOT military presence in one of UK sovereign areas. Of course, [garble—no?] indication now that GOC would consider even this much compensation. In addition to enosis with compensations we believe solution should also include some form of non-federation-federation. (Embtel 953 to Dept, dated Jan 2, 1965)³ Our talks here on island with various parties lead us to believe that neither Greeks nor Turk Cypriots are adamantly opposed to concepts set forth in that cable. This makes non-federation-federation perhaps best starting point for negotiations.

2. Believe that one way of getting around enosis problem would be to come up with some formula for postponing decision. This might be along following lines: parties would agree that although other elements of settlement would come into effect immediately question of enosis would be delayed until end of pre-established period, say five years. At that time people of Cyprus voting as whole and not by community would hold plebiscite under UN supervision. They would be asked to consider whether they favored continued independence or enosis with Greece, but it would be agreed in advance that none of rights given Turk Cypriots in other parts of settlement or arrangements preserving these rights would be changed no matter which way vote went. During five year period international financial assistance would be given to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to leave island if they so chose or to resettle elsewhere on island itself. (Last concept would have to be worked out carefully to avoid it being cloak for partition.) Also during period UN would maintain fairly large observer force which would assist UN Commissioner for Human Rights. At end of period and after plebiscite Turk Cypriots only would be asked to vote on whether or not they wished such Commission and Observer Force to continue.

3. We realize that this suggestion means continuation of enosis issue for several years but think it might be easier for Turks to accept than immediate enosis even with compensation, thus perhaps lowering price of latter. Furthermore, pro-enosists here becoming discredited and considerably weaker than at various times previously during Cyprus crisis and there is now very little pressure which can be brought to bear on Archbishop to accept enosis with compensations. As long as Makarios is around he will determine island’s basic attitude towards enosis and Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly accept his tactical approach of obtaining unfettered self-determination first.

4. On short range approaches believe that in addition to measures suggested Ankara’s 819 we might consider seriously idea para 5 Deptel 1765 to USUN,⁴ of having Bernardes center his operations in Nicosia and deal with GOG and GOT through respective Embassies. With his low visibility Bernardes could “mediate” without trappings of formal mediation, facilitate GOG and GOT “dialogue” without either formally having to agree to such and expand Turk and Greek Cypriot talks on daily problems into wider elements of overall settlement without attracting undue attention. In fact, Bernardes already has opportunities in daily diplomatic round here to make moves along these lines, but because of his mandate and temperament is extremely cautious and presumably would need some push from SYG. Best of all, perhaps, using Bernardes in this way would give us chance to monitor and even guide course of talks (Embtel 351).⁵

5. In any case we think that emphasis on obtaining “mediation” and “mediator” somewhat misplaced in context realities Cyprus situation. [garble] is that mediation implies partial effort by Mediator and our guess is that as Tuomioja and Galo Plaza before him Bernardes would end up with same general conclusions as Plaza report. In light of this we would cast Bernardes in role para 4, rather than as new Mediator. However he thought he could get parties to talk with each other through him we agree with Ankara that US–UK “external initiatives” will be necessary to reach final agreement.

Cross

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to USUN, London, Paris, Athens, and Ankara.
2. Telegram 819 from Ankara, January 20, suggested a U.S. approach to the forthcoming talks with the British on Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 364 from Nicosia, January 21, endorsed these proposals but noted that neither the Cypriot nor Greek Government appeared ready to negotiate (Ibid.)
3. Not printed. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 1765 to USUN, January 21, the Department of State provided guidance for dealing with diplomatic inquiries about the U.S. position on U.N. mediation. (Ibid.)
5. Dated January 24. (Ibid., STR 10 VIET N)