Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State ¹

Ankara, December 20, 1965, 1614Z.

685. Ref: Embtel 683.² Cyprus. NATUS. Following is Embassy’s preliminary assessment of effect of UNGA Cyprus vote³ on Turkish Government and Turkish political and public opinion.

1. GA vote marks major diplomatic defeat for Turkey which has been preparing for this test for more than year. In anticipation debate would occur in 19th GA, Turks dispatched good-will missions to Africa, Arab countries, Eastern Europe, Far East and Latin America as part of concerted GOT policy of broadening its international relationships. Turk officials realistically recognized difficulties of explaining their Cyprus policy in Afro-Asian world and in Latin America, where many countries have minority problems and where resolutions calling for “independence” and “sovereignty” and eschewing “intervention” evoke favorable response. Also recognized local Greek communities would be able to exert influence on policies some governments. However, magnitude of Turkish defeat has come as great surprise, particularly fact GOT failed obtain support of any non-aligned Afro-Asian countries or any LAs and was deserted by all its NATO partners except US.

2. Most serious substantive aspect of GA action for Turks is language in 31-nation resolution calling upon nations to desist from intervention in Cyprus, thus undermining GOT’s fundamental argument its intervention rights are guaranteed by London-Zurich Agreements. While statements of Demirel and Caglayangil emphasize that GOT does not consider resolution binding, fact remains majority of those voting supported Cypriot view that this aspect of treaties is void. Consequently, GA resolution represents additional restraint on its policies which GOT must weigh in considering next steps re Cyprus, particularly if it continues seek improve its relations with Afro-Asian countries.

3. US-Turkish bilateral relations have been strengthened by strong US support for GOT, as demonstrated by warm statements of appreciation by Foreign Minister Caglayangil and Acting Secretary General Binkaya (USUN 84; Embtel 679).⁴ Over weekend number of Turks, both civilian and military, voiced gratitude for US support. However, inability of US to influence other UN members, coupled with RPP and TLP attempts to cast suspicion on US motives (reftel) may partially offset current reinforcement of US-Turkish bilateral relations.

Furthermore, failure of any other NATO country to support Turkey will provide additional ammunition for those who question value of NATO Alliance.

4. Outside government circles, Cyprus vote has provided opposition with exploitable issue and Inonu’s statement is clear signal that RPP during forthcoming GNA debate will charge Demirel government with gross mishandling of Turkey’s case in New York. In this effort, RPP will benefit from its earlier decision not to permit RPP Deputies to become members of Turkey’s UN Delegation and can count on support TLP.

RPP and TLP attacks in GNA will be reinforced by opposition press which is already highlighting dimensions of Turkish defeat while ignoring fact no Turkish Government could have achieved much greater success. Theme of TLP and anti-American elements in RPP will be that Turkey’s defeat attributable primarily to bankruptcy of GOT’s alignment policy. Secondary theme, in which almost all opposition elements can join, will be ineptness with which unsophisticated Demirel government handles foreign affairs. Elements in press will also seek to twist US support for Turkey as example of back-stage deal by US, as allegation already advanced by RPP propagandist Cihat Baban in party organ Ulus (reftel). Efforts of parliamentary opposition to convert adverse GA vote into major domestic political issue may be supplemented by use of student demonstrations.

5. Embassy’s preliminary conclusion is that while GA vote has been major setback for new Demirel government, it can ride out current storm by continuing to reject resolution, by pointing out government’s policies essentially same as predecessor government’s, including third coalition, and by emphasizing anomalous nature of vote. Foreign Ministry officials are already publicly stressing fact that more than one-half of those voting either voted against resolution or abstained. Privately they making point that majority of pro-Cypriot votes came from African nations with limited influence in world affairs and with no direct responsibility for problems of Eastern Mediterranean.

Major unanswered questions are effect of resolution on ultimate settlement of Cyprus dispute and on future direction Turkish foreign policy. US support for [garble] resolution was based on premise substantive resolution would hinder progress toward ultimate solution to problem. This judgment remains sound although it is too early to determine degree to which GA action will set back prospect of negotiations between parties directly involved. Much will depend upon how Makarios decides to exploit limited, tactical advantage achieved at UN. It is also premature to assess longer-term effect of GA vote on Turkish foreign policy other than to say that GA defeat may cause GOT to review some of basic considerations underlying its current policies.

Hart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to USUN, Nicosia, Athens, London, Paris, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana.
2. Telegram 683 from Ankara, December 20, reported press reaction to Turkey’s defeat at the United Nations. (Ibid.)
3. Resolution 2077 (XX) passed on December 18 by a vote of 47 (including Greece and Cyprus) in favor, 5 opposed (including the United States and Turkey), and 54 abstentions (including the Soviet Union). The resolution called for respect of the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 521.
4. Both dated December 18. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)