Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

202. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 20, 1965, 1825Z.

279. As Greek political crisis enters its fifth week it is becoming increasingly clear that viable solution to present anomaly is nowhere in sight. Even if Tsirimokos’ effort to form govt is successful—which does not seem too likely as of this writing—country must expect turmoil for months to come.² Whatever govt is formed under present circumstances will undoubtedly be an unstable one, with a razor-thin majority in Parl. If Tsirimokos does indeed secure vote of confidence next week, his continuation in power will be dependent on votes of an extremely disparate group, ranging from rightist ERE to his own centre-leftist followers, and will count for support upon such unpredictable personalities as Progressive leader Markezinis and EPEK head Papapolitis, any one of whom could suddenly pull rug out from under Tsirimokos govt by withdrawing support.

Even more serious in its effect on political stability is fact that former PriMin Papandreou and his followers will be touring country, beginning tomorrow, in effort to keep atmosphere as turbulent as possible. Continued demonstrations both in Athens and in provinces are in prospect, creating conditions hardly conducive to serious deliberation by Parl in session. Although demonstrations have been frequent, few have been marked by violence. Eventually serious violence may take place, particularly if Papandreou supporters feel their own strength ebbing. And of course if Papandreou takes to road ERE Party may consider it has to do likewise unless it wishes to leave field to Papandreou forces.

Unfortunately, this prospect of continued political instability comes at time when Greece is facing problems of major dimensions both on domestic and foreign fronts. Although Cyprus has been relatively quiet during first month of Greek political crisis, it is at least questionable whether it will continue to remain so in months ahead. Equally urgent are pressing economic problems, characterized by the continued fall in foreign exchange reserves and an increasing trade imbalance. Business confidence will undoubtedly be deeply shaken if prospects for eventual stable govt do not improve. A govt without a solid foundation—either in Parl or among general public—will hardly be in position to make firm (and probably unpopular) decisions in the coming months.

In addition to prospects for continued instability, two aspects of current crisis are particularly disturbing. First is that as result efforts to prevent extension Papandreou’s influence into military and security forces, King had directly descended into political area with result that the “regime” issue has gradually arisen. And this despite repeated denials of Papandreou that there is any “question of monarchy” involved or that CU would raise it in future elections.³ Anti-royalist sentiment is being continuously inflamed by such pro-Papandreou publications as powerful Lambrakis syndicate (To Vima and Ta Nea) which daily carry attacks on King. Vima for example recently carried editorial critical of King under heading: “Crown showing contempt for people.” Slogans chanted and paraded by leftist-led demonstrators for Papandreou are becoming increasingly bold; although initially anti-monarchist slogans concentrated on Queen Mother (“the German woman must go”), in recent days they have included King himself. One banner in Aug 17 demonstrations read “people don’t want you—take your mother and go.” Thus, regardless of promises of Papandreou camp that they are not raising monarchist issue, in effect it has already been raised.

Second disturbing aspect is achievement of extreme left in making its catchwords the slogans of center through its collaboration “at the base” with followers of George Papandreou. For first time since bandit war Communists are no longer isolated but have succeeded in merging at popular level with much larger masses of center. It is difficult to determine what is Communist demonstration and what is not, since slogans have become virtually identical, except that Communists cleverly insert slogans peculiarly their own on such non-Greek topics as Vietnam, “imperialism,” etc. While CU supporters provide bulk of demonstrators, Communists often provide leadership and hence are able to control demonstrations.

It seems clear that any long-term solution to current crisis must come through elections, however distasteful this may be to many quarters, including the Palace. As of now Crown maintains (quite rightly) that present climate is completely unsuitable for elections, and electoral campaign in current tense atmosphere would very probably be characterized by serious violence. Even more important from the Palace and conservative point of view, because current tide running in Papandreou’s favor, former PriMin might well equal his 1964 feat of 53 per cent of popular vote. There are few serious politicians, even in his own party, who would welcome prospect of Papandreou returned with heavy popular vote (which he would consider vindication of his struggle with King) and probably determined to punish those he considered responsible for his troubles in Palace, army, and his own party. Further, a Papandreou victory would not bring with it the tempering influence of more conservative leaders of party such as Costopoulos, Novas, Mitsotakis, etc. The influence of his left-leaning son Andreas in govt would undoubtedly be greater with so many of other major figures departed. Further, heavy vote in favor of Papandreou could only be interpreted as blow to King, despite Papandreou’s denial that monarchy question would be involved; very possibly Papandreou would move to limit role and influence of Crown in Greek political life. Finally, return of Papandreous would probably increase unwholesome political tensions in military and security forces.

For these reasons, King, supported by ERE, Progressives and sizeable element of CU, strongly opposes elections, and would consider instability for indefinite period preferable to return of Papandreou. However, as unstable situation continues, pressure for elections from Papandreou will undoubtedly increase and idea might well gain support even among other elements (now opposed to elections) as only available means of clarifying situation.

Anschuetz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, Paris for James and Burns, and USDOCOSouth for Burris.
2. On August 14, Tsirimokos withdrew from the Center Union. On August 18, King Constantine asked him to form a government. He took office on August 20 and was defeated in an August 28 vote of confidence by 135 to 159.
3. At a meeting with Embassy officials on August 25, Papandreou reiterated this assurance. (Telegram 304 from Athens, August 25; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GREECE)