196. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
1917. Confrontation between King and PriMin over question of military leadership remains distinct possibility although pressures for compromise on both sides are at work. Embassy has reliable information (Embtel 1880)2 that King is disposed to make stand on question of retention of present Army Chief of Staff, and has apparently decided to either prevail upon Papandreou to accept this position or else demand PriMin’s [Page 417] resignation. On other hand, both PriMin’s personal secretary and his son Andreas have told U.S. officials in last few days that Papandreou is equally determined to remove Gennimatas and if King refuses, PriMin will resign.3
In event confrontation does occur, likely outcome would be resignation of PriMin and his replacement by other member of govt, possibly Deputy PriMin and MinCoord Stephanopoulos. Key question is whether Stephanopoulos or other political figure could secure sufficient number of votes from own party to form govt. Support of 99 ERE deputies is probable, since most anxious to bring down Papandreou and would likely be willing to support CU govt led by acceptable figure such as Stephanopoulos for limited time. However, if new vote unable to obtain minimum of 50–60 deputies from CU ranks, then elections would be in offing, despite fact that almost no one (with exception of Papandreou) would want them.
Dangerous aspect of current situation twofold: (1) If new election held, Papandreou would in all probability be returned with approximately same strength as at present, and could conceivably receive even stronger mandate. This would be heavy blow to King’s prestige, particularly since Papandreou, supported by left, would possibly make monarchy an issue in elections. (2) If Stephanopoulos or other CU figure succeeded in forming new govt, Papandreou might go to streets to try bring down such govt. With leftist support, Papandreou would have capacity to provoke serious demonstrations throughout country. At this point army might intervene, fearing that stability of regime were being shaken.
Whatever outcome, confrontation at this time (while Papandreou still popular) and on issue of army leadership would appear to be unfortunate step both from point of view U.S. and Greek interests. Even opponents of Papandreou in both govt and opposition ranks believe timing is not right for challenge to PriMin. They maintain that in fall, when economic problems reach critical stage, PriMin’s popularity will fall sharply, and challenge to his leadership will then come from within his own party, from Mitsotakis forces. However, these anti-Papandreou forces within party might be reluctant to line up with Palace against PriMin now. Deputies would not now relish facing alternatives of elections on one hand or participating in coalition supported by ERE on other.
Indications are that King, undoubtedly under influence of rightwing advisors, believes that his leadership of armed forces is being eroded by army’s involvement in politics and by its penetration by forces [Page 418] loyal to Papandreous (such as Aspida) rather than to throne. Therefore, King apparently is being persuaded that he must make stand now, rather than at later time, when his position might be weaker.
Embassy remains hopeful that head-on collision will be averted through realization by both sides that confrontation not in their best interests, and we are taking every opportunity to point out that confrontation would be damaging to nation’s interests.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and USDOCOSouth for Burris.↩
- Telegram 1880, June 23, reported a conversation with the Chief of the Royal Political Bureau, Choidas. (Ibid.)↩
- Andreas Papandreou commented on his father’s plan in a June 27 talk with Richard Barham, Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs, at the Department of State. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., POL GREECE.↩