151. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 1

471. Costopoulos told me at lunch he had just come from small Cabinet meeting which considered report made by Garoufalias following his return early this morning from overnight visit to Nicosia.

Costopoulos said (presumably on basis Garoufalias’ report) that:

A.
Makarios had not succeeded in obtaining UAR airfield facilities.
B.
Nasser had promised provide certain unspecified type war materials, presumably obsolescent British equipment for most part.
C.
Makarios insists Kyprianou visit Moscow shortly. Costopoulos interpreted this as indication Soviets proving somewhat shy in discussion with Cypriots. GOG has no specific information regarding negotiations with Soviets including question of planes.
D.
Kyprianou coming to Athens tomorrow and may request see me. Costopoulos asserted Makarios had suggested calling on me at time his most recent visit here in order assure USG that he (Makarios) has no desire or intention fall into hands of Soviets.
E.
Costopoulos said he thought Soviet motor torpedo boats had been delivered to Cypriots and that Greeks providing at least some elements of crews. He was not precise.
F.
Makarios agreed to rotation Turk contingent (Embtel 470)2 provided this done under supervision UNFICYP in order insure departing Turks genuinely soldiers (not non-combatant peasants) and that replacements not all officers.

I reviewed for Costopoulos our analysis of Turk legal position with regard right rotate its contingent, fact London/Zurich Accords could be changed only by mutual agreement (Deptel 400)3 as well as our position on use MAP equipment (Deptel 403).4 Costopoulos seemed well aware of US positions.

I also pointed out introduction military equipment into Cyprus from any source might produce violent Turk reaction and that USG would be constrained raise such action in Security Council as violation [Page 299] UN resolutions. Costopoulos accepted this statement with a faintly ironical smile, noting that this position was at variation with the personal advice Nikolareizis received from Acheson.

We had inconclusive discussion with regard to what likely occur in event Cyprus problem raised at UNGA as well as some discussion of status Greek citizens in Istanbul after September 16. Costopoulos mentioned GOG has discussed Istanbul situation with UN SYG with view to raising question in Security Council in near future.

I endeavored obtain from Costopoulos statement of how GOG sees evolution of Cyprus problem. Costopoulos answered it is important that new Mediator be appointed, that conditions for negotiations be restored and that tranquility be maintained on island. This would decrease tension and passion which in turn would enhance capability GOG gain acceptance on Cyprus of solution negotiated with Turks, provided Turks proved reasonable.

When pressed as to outlines of possible negotiated solution, Costopoulos pointedly referred to an article on Cyprus in August 27 issue of foreign report published by Economist. Without accepting responsibility for formula set forth in this article, he said that solution along these lines (with the exception of the removal of the Patriarchate from Istanbul) could be contemplated by GOG.

Plan set forth in Economist foreign report provides for enosis with protection of Turkish minority. Turkey would receive large scale economic development assistance, removal of Patriarchate to Mount Athos or Patmos, establishment of NATO base possibly on one of present British bases with Turk participation, transfer of Kastellorizon to Turkey and rectification of boundary between Greek and Turkish Thrace so that the railway line from Istanbul to Idirne would fall entirely within Turkish territory. I noted that aside from fact Turks unlikely to accept this proposal, interesting to note implied provisions that US would pick up substantial part of bill for Turkish economic development plan, and that British would provide military base. Costopoulos acknowledged I had not failed grasp essential elements this formula.

Costopoulos, in his indefatigable effort assure an appropriate future for Makarios today noted that Patriarchate of Alexandria likely to become vacant shortly. Although we both appreciated poetic aspect of this solution, neither Costopoulos nor I evidenced any optimism that Makarios would be irresistibly attracted by this opportunity.

Labouisse
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, and USUN. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
  2. Telegram 470, September 2, reported on Greek efforts to disengage from Makarios. (Ibid.)
  3. Telegram 400 to Athens, August 30, outlined the legal basis for Turkey’s right to a troop rotation. (Ibid.)
  4. Dated August 31. (Ibid.)