Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

149. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 27, 1964, 10 p.m.

435. Deptel 378.²

1. While hesitating further to delay delivery of President’s message to King, I feel that President Johnson should be aware that I continue to entertain the gravest doubts about the wisdom of his proposing that Greeks now make concessions beyond those suggested by Acheson. The following expansion of reasons set forth in Embtel 424³ deserves most serious consideration:

A. In involving himself in a successful effort to push Makarios further than Papandreou had been able on the question of a base, the King also involved himself in a delicate constitutional issue. You will appreciate that the govt has seemed reluctant to discuss his proposal with us and may be sitting back to see what results will flow from the King’s “meddling.” The King will be plunged into profound embarrassment vis-à-vis the govt if one of his first real efforts in diplomacy results in his getting a tougher line from the President than the US has so far put to the govt. This will considerably damage the King’s prestige (which Papandreou may well wish to do) and make him less willing in the future to try to be helpful.

B. The rap on the King’s knuckles is exaggerated by the inconsistency between what the President now would be proposing and Acheson’s characterization of his less demanding proposals as “fair” (his letter of August 20)⁴ and as “equitable, realistic and reasonable arrangements” (his letter of August 26).⁵ Moreover, Acheson has told the GOG that the Turks have not finally rejected his proposals.

C. If it is to be our policy to push the Greeks for concessions beyond those which Mr. Acheson was proposing, this policy, it seems to me, should be put first to the govt rather than the King.

D. I strongly recommend that if the President wants to include the paragraph in question, it be rephrased to read as follows:

“After all, that part of the Karpas Peninsula which Mr. Acheson proposed for a Turkish base is only a little more than 5 percent of the area of Cyprus. This would not appear in any serious way to derogate from the great benefits that would flow to the Greek peoples from the accession of Cyprus to the territory of the Hellenese.” (This re-phrasing eliminates the reference to a larger area than was proposed by Acheson and the reference to the granting of the area in perpetuity to the Turkish Government.)⁶

Labouisse

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Geneva for Acheson, Ankara, London, and the White House. Passed to DOD and CIA.
2. Telegram 378 to Athens, August 27, contained the revisions to the text of a letter to King Constantine. (Ibid.) The original text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 366 to Athens, August 26. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 424 from Athens, August 27, outlined suggested changes to the Presidential message. (Ibid.)
4. See Document 134.
5. The Acheson letter of August 26 was transmitted to the Department of State as an attachment to airgram A–166 from Athens, August 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
6. In telegram 385 to Athens, August 27, the Department of State approved further modifications in the President’s letter to King Constantine. (Ibid.) In telegram 449 from Athens, August 28, Labouisse reported that he had delivered the message. A copy of the letter is ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Cyprus-Miscellaneous.