148. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 1
411. DCM called on Costopoulos in effort obtain [garble] considerations lying behind King’s letter to President Johnson (Embtel 407).2 Costopoulos said GOG would be prepared to assume obligation of negotiating NATO base after enosis. In fact, there could probably be two bases, one on Karpas Peninsula of about 50 square miles and one in Cape Greco area of about 50 square miles, totalling approximately area existing British bases. He referred also to base on Kastellorizon. Papandreou probably prepared make this undertaking in writing. Costopoulos made it quite clear he had little confidence in Makarios’ sincerity.
DCM commented information regarding location and dimensions of bases indispensable to permit USG evaluate King’s proposal and that a written undertaking on the part of Papandreou to this effect would be essential to add element of reality to situation.
Next step would be to request Grivas come to Athens, possibly tomorrow, to obtain his concurrence, at least in principle. Costopoulos implied question of precise area and location of NATO base, or bases, might not be specifically discussed with Makarios or Grivas. This aspect of solution would be undertaken only by GOG as an obligation to be discharged after enosis. GOG would, however, say publicly at time enosis proposed and Greek and Cypriot Parliaments convoked, that GOG would be prepared grant NATO base and that Makarios had concurred.
Costopoulos confided to DCM on “top secret” basis, that Kyprianou and Georkadjis had agreed to support a GOG push for enosis when the appropriate circumstances have been created. This apparently included agreement to principle of NATO base and willingness denounce Makarios in event his defection. Meanwhile some additional 500 military, “not fighters, mostly technicians” (sic), were being sent to Cyprus and other unspecified measures being taken strengthen GOG position there.
DCM pushed Costopoulos hard regarding current status of Cypriot/Soviet negotiations. Costopoulos was very vague, but after further interrogation said one of principal reasons for Makarios’ visit to Cairo [Page 295] tomorrow is to make arrangements for basing of “the 15 planes” which Makarios is endeavoring to have delivered as soon as possible. Although Costopoulos declined to be precise, DCM came away with impression planes presumably of Soviet origin might be available within next week or so, and that they would be piloted ostensibly by Cypriots but actually by Greek civilians. (Comment: Garoufalias once argued that use Greek civilian pilots would provide GOG with best possible control if Makarios insisted planes be made available to GOG.)
Comment: Costopoulos explanation leaves much to be desired, and DCM tells me FonMin obviously did not appear prepared to talk of matter in any detail. I have asked to see PriMin. If GOG prepared screw up its courage, give us assurances in writing along lines King’s proposal but with more detail, and force issue with Makarios, King’s proposal probably worth serious consideration by GOT, UK and USG. GOG (assuming Grivas backing) may have in mind possibility using alleged Makarios “commitment” as justification for public break with him.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Nodis-TAG. Received at 11:07 a.m. and repeated to Ankara, London, Geneva for Acheson, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House.↩
- Telegram 407 from Athens, August 26, reported that the King had won Makarios’ agreement to the creation of a NATO base on Cyprus following enosis, and government and opposition agreement in Greece for the lease of a base on Kastellorizon to Turkey. (Ibid.) The text of the King’s message to President Johnson was transmitted in telegram 408 from Athens, August 26. (Ibid.)↩