136. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
362. Have just returned from 10:30 p.m. meeting with PriMin at which Costopoulos, Andreas Papandreou and Sossides were present on Greek side. Anschuetz and Brewster accompanied me.
I opened discussion by recalling PriMin’s urgent request for “instant enosis” and USG assistance; also my reservations that this could be accomplished without prior agreement on Turk demands. I said highest officials USG including President had concerned themselves with matter for past several days and had confirmed view that would be impossible proceed without prior understanding with GOT. After taking into account various developments in long history of matter, and in view urgent necessity reach immediate solution, Washington officials and Acheson had come up with proposal which went long way to meet Greek aspirations. We were by no means sure however that Turks could be persuaded to go along.
I then presented Acheson letter to Papandreou which Andreas Papandreou read in English and then translated into Greek. In submitting letter I made unvarnished presentation based inter alia on points Deptel 327 to Athens,2 emphasizing that this proposed solution not a bargaining position and represents Acheson’s and USG’s best assessment of what might be made acceptable to Turks. I stressed particularly that a Greek national decision was essential to put solution across and underlined the fact that this solution offered the possibility of avoiding a Communist take-over of island and averting the extension of Communist power over a very much larger area including Greece itself.
PriMin acknowledged danger which Communist control of Cyprus would pose for Greece. After listening to the presentation attentively he explained that he must have a solution which can be rationally explained not only to his own people but also to the people of Cyprus and their “devilish leader Makarios.” He confirmed offer Costopoulos had made to me two hours earlier that GOG prepared lease an area of 99 square miles on Karpas Peninsula. He added that if he had to deal only with Greek public opinion he could possibly have agreed to lease of roughly 200 square miles. However, in his struggle with Makarios he would be [Page 274] placed in a very difficult, and probably impossible, position if he granted Turks double the area of the two British bases.
I stressed again that the area delineated, which appeared to be not much more than 5 percent of land area of Cyprus, was absolute minimum which Acheson considers Turks might be willing to accept. We went over map a number of times showing where Turk demands had originally started and how they had been compressed.
At termination meeting Papandreou confirmed Sossides would leave for Geneva tomorrow carrying back Papandreou’s answer to Acheson letter. I concluded by earnestly imploring PriMin to give this letter most serious consideration as a final offer inasmuch as it was Mr. Acheson’s view, shared by entire USG including President, that this was best deal which could be obtained for Greece.
Comment: Greek side listened most attentively to entire proposal. Presentation I had made earlier in evening to Costopoulos had obviously had salutary effect. There was no detailed discussion of method of public presentation Acheson proposal if accepted, or of procedures in effecting enosis which I made clear we considered responsibility of GOG. However, when passage in letter re possible future determination of western boundary by SACEUR was reached, FonMin dryly commented in Greek to Papandreou, “That’s the Vaseline.” Although Papandreou made no comment it was apparent that he appreciated that he was confronted by a fundamental decision and that this decision must be made promptly. I believe he would sincerely like to meet Acheson proposal but has not yet resolved in his own mind how he can face Makarios and Cypriot opinion as well as his own potential supporters such as Grivas and Georkadzis.
Postscript: I threw everything at him but the glove. Goodnight for now.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Nodis-TAG. Received at 10:20 p.m. on August 20 and repeated to Geneva for Acheson, Ankara, London, and Nicosia. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.↩
- Document 135.↩