Office of the Historian
  1. Home
  2. Historical Documents
  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey
  4. Document 1

1. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 24, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

  • Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
  • Nigel Trench, Counselor, British Embassy
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
  • Henry T. Koren, SEA

The Ambassador said that the outlook both for the London conference2 and the situation on the island was very black. The Greeks and Turks in London were poles apart, and the Cypriot Turks were very nervous about their position. If there were a breakdown in London and a flare-up in Cyprus, very strong measures would have to be taken. He asked the Secretary’s opinion on the relative merits of a UN “peace-keeping” mission and a force drawn from NATO countries. He mentioned that the Greek Foreign Minister had suggested a NATO force.

The Secretary replied he wasn’t fully advised on the question and could not give a final answer now, but he could see advantages in discussing it in NATO, which might produce some pressure on the Greeks and Turks. If the three guarantor powers plus Cyprus so requested, he could see some advantage in using troops from NATO powers. He thought it would probably be best not to have any such force under the NATO label, but it might be better to draw on the NATO nations rather than put the matter to the UN. The Secretary said he could give no answer on the question of a U.S. contingent. He pointed out we have some 17,000 troops in Turkey and if our troops were in Cyprus shooting at Turks, we might run into some serious trouble in Turkey, [Page 2] where they might begin shooting at us. He also mentioned our interest in the security of our important installations on Cyprus.

The Secretary continued he hoped they could keep talking in London. The Ambassador reiterated that the situation in the island was bad and the talks deadlocked. If fighting broke out Turkey might take some precipitate action. Mr. Burdett said that EUR’s feeling was that the gravity of the situation and the many complications of using troops from NATO countries made it desirable that Cyprus be a first priority for UK troops. The Secretary observed that there should be a note of caution on priorities in view of the serious and spreading situation in East Africa. If the situation quickly went bad UK troops were the only and best way; but otherwise troops from some NATO countries acceptable to both the Greeks and Turks might be used. He mentioned Norway as an example.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Koren and approved in S on February 8.↩
  2. Reference is to the January 15–February 5 meeting of representatives of the Government of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots, and representatives of the three guarantor powers: Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.↩